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Abstract 
 The present thesis presents the first known systematic investigation of the 
personal goals and motivations of people with persecutory delusions.  Motivational 
characteristics of goals are both theoretically implicated in symptom persistence and 
clinically relevant to the refinement of psychological therapies. Goals motivated by 
avoidance, rather than approach, and by external motivations rather than internal 
'self-concordant' ones, have been implicated in the persistence of depression, and an 
analogous role in delusion persistence is feasible.  
 Thirty participants with persecutory delusions and schizophrenia-spectrum 
diagnoses completed measures of depression, anxiety and paranoia, as well as of 
goals and motivations. It was hypothesised that higher depression scores would be 
associated with fewer approach motivations, more avoidance motivations and lower 
self-concordance of goals, as has been found previously in groups without psychosis. 
 A phenomenological profile of participants' personal goals is presented. Two 
of the three study hypotheses were supported. Higher levels of depression were 
associated with more avoidance motivations and lower goal self-concordance in the 
group. An exploratory link of avoidance motivations with paranoia was also identified. 
The hypothesised association of depression with approach motivations was not 
found. 
 The findings are consistent with a proposal that avoidant and externally-
motivated goal pursuit might contribute to the persistence of persecutory delusions, 
as well as depression. Therapeutic outcomes may be facilitated by supporting clients 
to identify self-concordant goals to approach valued achievements, rather than 
avoiding feared consequences. It is hoped that further research can continue to 
develop a motivational perspective on the experiences of those holding distressing 
persecutory beliefs, with the aim of improving psychological therapies for the future. 
 Page 4 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1. The main persecutory belief reported by each participant. ......................... 65 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of participants' clinical and cognitive questionnaire 
scores. ..................................................................................................................... 67 
Table 3. Numbers and percentages of participants who scored in each clinical cut-off 
category, according to the BDI and BAI. .................................................................. 67 
Table 4. The top prioritised goal for the next year identified by each participant. ..... 71 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for numbers of goal motivations by subtype, and self-
concordance scores relating to participants' top three goals. ................................... 72 
Table 6. Correlations of depression scores with goal motivations and self-
concordance, with associated significance values.. ................................................. 73 
Table 7. Correlation coefficients and associated significance values for associations 
of goal motivation and self-concordance scores with clinical and cognitive 
questionnaire measures. ......................................................................................... 76 
 
 
 
 
 Page 5 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. The multidimensional severity of persecutory delusions in the sample. .... 66 
Figure 2. Numbers of goals identified in each category by the group as a whole. .... 69 
Figure 3. Numbers of 'top three' goals identified in each category by the group. ...... 70 
Figure 4. Scatter plot of participants' BDI scores and avoidance motivations. .......... 74 
Figure 5. Scatter plot of participants' BDI scores and total goal self-concordance. .. 75 
Figure 6. Mean (SD) approach and avoidance motivations identified per goal, 
classified by goal content category. ......................................................................... 78 
Figure 7. Mean (SD) goal self-concordance scores per goal, classified by goal 
content category. ..................................................................................................... 78 
Figure 8. Participants' mean mood ratings at the beginning and end of the 
assessment procedure.. .......................................................................................... 80 
 
 
 
 Page 6 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1. Introduction ...................................................................................... 10 
1.1 Definition and clinical significance of persecutory delusions ..................... 10 
1.2 Psychological therapy for persecutory delusions ...................................... 12 
1.3 A multifactorial model of persecutory delusions and their persistence ...... 14 
1.4 Anxiety, worry and delusion persistence .................................................. 15 
1.5 Depression, negative beliefs about the self and delusion persistence ...... 16 
1.6 Improving psychological therapy for persecutory delusions through 
depression-related processes .................................................................. 17 
1.7 Definition and clinical significance of personal goals ................................ 20 
1.7.1 Perceptual Control Theory.................................................................... 23 
1.7.2 Approach goals and avoidance goals ................................................... 25 
1.7.3 Approach and avoidance goals in relation to clinical depression .......... 28 
1.7.4 Making sense of inconsistent findings: underlying motivation ............... 29 
1.7.5 Self-Determination Theory and goal self-concordance ......................... 31 
1.8 The role of goals in cognitive behavioural therapies ................................. 35 
1.9 Goals of people with delusions ................................................................. 38 
1.10 Summary ................................................................................................. 41 
1.11 Aims and hypotheses of the study ............................................................ 42 
Chapter 2. Methods ........................................................................................... 44 
2.1 Design ...................................................................................................... 44 
2.2 Participants .............................................................................................. 44 
2.2.1 Power analysis ..................................................................................... 44 
2.2.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria ............................................................. 45 
2.2.3 Sample ................................................................................................. 45 
2.3 Measures ................................................................................................. 46 
 Page 7 
2.3.1 Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) ............................................................. 46 
2.3.2 Clinical symptom interviews ................................................................. 46 
2.3.3 Clinical symptom questionnaires .......................................................... 50 
2.3.4 Cognitive measures.............................................................................. 52 
2.3.5 Goals and motivations .......................................................................... 54 
2.4 Ethical approval and research sites .......................................................... 57 
2.5 Procedure ................................................................................................ 58 
2.6 Analysis ................................................................................................... 59 
2.7 Summary ................................................................................................. 60 
Chapter 3. Results ............................................................................................. 61 
3.1 Missing data ............................................................................................. 61 
3.2 Normality of distributions and outliers in the data ..................................... 61 
3.3 Participant demographic and clinical characteristics ................................. 63 
3.3.1 Demographics ...................................................................................... 63 
3.3.2 Clinical characteristics .......................................................................... 63 
3.4 Clinical and cognitive measures ............................................................... 64 
3.4.1 Delusion severity .................................................................................. 64 
3.4.2 Clinical and cognitive questionnaire measures ..................................... 66 
3.4.3 Premorbid IQ and verbal fluency .......................................................... 67 
3.5 Personal goals ......................................................................................... 68 
3.5.1 Descriptive overview of goals ............................................................... 68 
3.5.2 Goal motivations: approach, avoidance and self-concordance ............. 72 
3.6 Hypothesis testing: correlations of depression scores with goal motivations 
and self-concordance .............................................................................. 72 
3.7 Additional exploratory analyses ................................................................ 75 
3.8 Goal motivations and self-concordance by category ................................ 77 
 Page 8 
3.9 Acceptability of the study procedures: visual analogue scale mood ratings 
and feedback ........................................................................................... 79 
3.10 Summary ................................................................................................. 82 
Chapter 4. Discussion ........................................................................................ 83 
4.1 Personal goals identified by the group...................................................... 84 
4.1.1 Descriptive profile of goals ................................................................... 84 
4.2 Hypothesis testing .................................................................................... 87 
4.2.1 Avoidance motivations for personal goals ............................................ 88 
4.2.2 Negative findings regarding approach motivations ............................... 91 
4.2.3 Goals and motivation assessment procedures across studies .............. 93 
4.2.4 Depression and goal self-concordance................................................. 96 
4.3 Additional exploratory analyses ................................................................ 99 
4.4 Feasibility and acceptability of the assessment procedure ..................... 100 
4.5 Limitations .............................................................................................. 103 
4.5.1 Sample ............................................................................................... 103 
4.5.2 Design ................................................................................................ 105 
4.5.3 Validity of measures ........................................................................... 106 
4.6 Clinical implications ................................................................................ 107 
4.7 Indications for future research ................................................................ 109 
4.7.1 Longitudinal research ......................................................................... 110 
4.7.2 Multiple groups ................................................................................... 111 
4.7.3 Experimental research ....................................................................... 111 
4.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 112 
References ............................................................................................................ 113 
Appendices ........................................................................................................... 132 
Appendix A. Ethical approval letters .................................................................. 132 
NHS Research Ethics Committee provisional opinion ..................................... 133 
 Page 9 
NHS Research Ethics Committee favourable opinion ..................................... 138 
Royal Holloway Psychology Department ethical approval .............................. 143 
Research and Development Department approval letters ............................... 144 
Appendix B. Participant information sheet and consent form ............................ 146 
Appendix C. Study measures ............................................................................ 150 
Visual Analogue Scales of mood .................................................................... 150 
Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (Green et al., 2008) ............................ 151 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) ................... 153 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) ............... 154 
Psychotic SYmptoms RATing Scales: Delusions Scale (PSYRATS; Haddock, 
McCarron, Tarrier, & Faragher, 1999)............................................................. 155 
Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS; Fowler et al., 2006) .................................. 157 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990) .............................................................................................................. 158 
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR; Ginsberg, 2003).............................. 159 
FAS test (Benton & Hamsher, 1976) .............................................................. 160 
Goals and motivations assessment ................................................................ 161 
 
 
 Page 10 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
The present thesis concerns the personal goals and motivations of people with 
persecutory delusions. Goals and motivations are both theoretically implicated in the 
persistence of symptoms and clinically relevant to the refinement of therapies.  
Previous studies have identified personal goal attributes associated with depression, 
but no such research has been carried out thus far with people experiencing 
psychosis. Depression is known to be prevalent in groups of people with persecutory 
delusions. Goal motivations have been implicated in the persistence of depression 
over time, and have been found to predict functional and affective outcomes. 
Analogous effects are feasible for people with distressing persecutory beliefs. The 
assessment of personal goals and motivations is key to effective delivery of 
cognitive-behavioural therapies (CBT). It is therefore proposed that increasing our 
understanding of the personal goals and motivations of people with distressing 
persecutory beliefs will facilitate ongoing therapeutic development.  
 
The present chapter introduces the literature on persecutory delusions and the 
ongoing research agenda for refinement of talking therapies, and makes the case for 
the relevance of personal goals as an area deserving further research in this 
population. The chapter will conclude with a summary of the aims and hypotheses of 
the present investigation. 
 
1.1 Definition and clinical significance of persecutory 
delusions 
A persecutory delusion is an unfounded or unrealistic belief that harm is occurring, or 
is going to occur, to the self, and that the perpetrator intends to cause harm 
(Freeman & Garety, 1999). The exact definition of a delusion has attracted much 
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attention and debate (Garety, 1985; Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Rodrigues & Banzato, 
2010). A belief held by an individual is increasingly likely to be classified as a 
delusion the more it is implausible, seemingly unfounded, strongly held, 
preoccupying, distressing and unshared by others (Freeman, 2007; Oltmanns, 1988).  
 
Persecutory delusions are of considerable clinical significance as one of the most 
common and distressing symptoms of psychosis (Appelbaum, Robbins, & Roth, 
1999; Sartorius et al., 1986; Wessely et al., 1993). The World Health Organisation 
conducted an international prospective study of 1379 individuals contacting 
psychiatric services for the first time with symptoms of schizophrenia (Sartorius et al., 
1986). Persecutory delusions were the second most common psychotic symptom 
found, occurring in almost 50% of respondents (delusions of reference were the most 
common symptom). Persecutory delusions are associated with strong negative 
affect, and are the delusion type most likely to be acted upon (Appelbaum et al., 
1999; Wessely et al., 1993). The presence of persecutory delusions has been found 
to predict hospital admission on first contact with psychiatric services (Castle, 
Phelan, Wessely, & Murray, 1994). The understandably high levels of distress, 
preoccupation and functional disturbance caused by persecutory delusions, as well 
as their high prevalence among groups with psychosis, indicate this symptom as an 
important target for research and therapeutic intervention.  
 
A single symptom approach has illuminated the richness of delusional belief systems 
and the mechanisms of their effects on behaviour, which had not previously been 
captured by studies that focused on the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Delusions are 
complex, multi-faceted processes (Garety & Hemsley, 1994) which can vary widely in 
dimensions such as content, conviction, preoccupation, distress and functional 
impairment (Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier, & Faragher, 1999). Different facets of 
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delusions show differential associations with other processes. For example, Garety et 
al. (2005) found that in a sample of 100 people with delusions, delusional conviction 
was associated with reasoning biases and not with depression. Other studies (e.g. 
Freeman & Garety, 1999; Startup et al., 2007) have shown delusional distress to be 
associated with affective disturbance. 
 
1.2 Psychological therapy for persecutory delusions 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is an effective psychological treatment for 
psychosis (Wykes, Steel, Everitt, & Tarrier, 2008; Zimmermann, Favrod, Trieu, & 
Pomini, 2005), as reflected in the guidelines published by the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2009). The symptom improvements achieved 
during therapy are accompanied by correlated attenuations in brain responses to 
threatening stimuli (Kumari et al., 2011). CBT is usually used in combination with 
antipsychotic medication, but recently has shown promising results even without 
pharmacotherapy (Morrison et al., 2012). However, some studies have shown that 
30-50% of individuals with persistent positive symptoms did not measurably benefit 
from 'first generation' CBT interventions for psychosis (Kuipers et al., 1998). Recent 
meta-analyses have reported that although total positive psychotic symptom scores 
show beneficial effects, results are inconsistent for specific effects on delusions 
(NICE, 2009; van der Gaag, Valmaggia, & Smit, 2014). Van der Gaag and 
colleagues (2014) meta-analysed the results of 18 randomised controlled trials of 
formulation-based CBT for people experiencing psychosis, to examine therapeutic 
effects on hallucinations and delusions separately. The authors derived an overall 
statistically significant effect size of 0.36 for CBT effects on delusions, and 0.44 for 
hallucinations. When CBT was compared with active treatment, however, the effect 
on delusions lost statistical significance, whereas the significant effect on 
hallucinations remained. When only blinded studies were examined, the size of the 
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effect on delusions was reduced (0.24), whereas the effect on hallucinations 
increased (0.46). These findings suggest that the effectiveness of CBT for psychosis 
in ameliorating delusions is modest, and less consistent than its effect on 
hallucinations. A literature review of the effectiveness of CBT for persecutory 
delusions specifically (Garety, Bentall, & Freeman, 2008) concluded that effects were 
of small to moderate size, and that the mechanisms of change have not yet been 
confirmed. Clearly improvements in our therapeutic interventions for persecutory 
delusions are desirable, as well as an improved understanding of how these 
treatments effect change. 
 
Development of better treatments requires an improved understanding of the 
mechanisms which maintain paranoid beliefs. To this end, the current research 
agenda targeting the refinement of psychological therapies for persecutory delusions 
has focused on key cognitive and emotional processes with proposed causal 
relevance. From an 'interventionist-causal' perspective (Kendler & Campbell, 2009), 
a pragmatic research route to improving therapeutic interventions requires specific 
theoretical advances regarding candidate causal mechanisms, which should be 
followed by adequately controlled intervention studies, in which each theoretically 
driven factor is manipulated. Corresponding improvements in delusions can then be 
taken to indicate a causal effect (Freeman, 2011).  
 
Freeman & Garety (2014) summarised recent advances in the understanding and 
treatment of persecutory delusions, in which a number of specific psychological 
processes have been linked with delusion persistence. These processes included 
worry, negative thoughts about the self, interpersonal sensitivity, anomalous internal 
experiences, insomnia and reasoning biases. The first two of these - worry and 
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negative beliefs about the self - have particularly strong links with anxiety and 
depression, and will be discussed further in relation to delusion persistence below.  
 
1.3 A multifactorial model of persecutory delusions and 
their persistence 
Freeman and colleagues (2002) built on Garety and colleagues' (2001) 
biopsychosocial model of the positive symptoms of psychosis, to propose a 
multifactorial stress-vulnerability account of persecutory delusions. The authors 
conducted a review of available evidence, which suggested a number of different 
factors acting in various combinations to precipitate and maintain distressing beliefs 
in different individuals. The model therefore brings together a number of factors, 
which combine to increase the likelihood that a belief is formed or maintained, though 
no one factor may be individually necessary or sufficient (Freeman & Garety, 2014; 
Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002). Both the individual’s 
vulnerability and the precipitating stressor(s) may be biological, psychological and/or 
social. 
 
The model proposed that a stressor (such as a traumatic event or drug use) interacts 
with a pre-existing vulnerability to precipitate anomalous experiences (such as 
misattribution of internally-generated thoughts as heard voices), which lead to a 
search for meaning. The process of making sense of puzzling experiences is then 
impacted by core beliefs that the individual holds about themselves and the world, as 
well as by attributional biases, and cognitive biases associated with psychosis. The 
more an individual believes themselves to be a deserving or opportune target, and 
the world to be a dangerous place, the more likely they will be to arrive at a 
persecutory explanation. Such beliefs are then maintained by the relief that comes 
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from having found an explanation for confusing experiences, and by biases of 
attention and memory that may be associated with anxiety and depression (Freeman 
et al., 2013). 
 
Freeman and colleagues’ model emphasises key roles for anxiety and depression, 
and associated cognitive factors, in the maintenance of delusions. Subsequent 
research has therefore examined the roles of these factors, and targeted findings to 
enable evidence-based therapeutic developments. Among the cognitive factors 
highlighted in Freeman & Garety's (2014) review, worry and negative thoughts about 
the self have particularly strong associations with anxiety and depression, 
respectively (Freeman & Garety, 1999; Vorontsova, Garety, & Freeman, 2013). 
Anxiety and depression are both highly comorbid with psychosis (Birchwood, Iqbal, 
Chadwick, & Trower, 2000; Cosoff & Hafner, 1998), and both have been implicated in 
the maintenance of positive psychotic symptoms such as persecutory delusions in 
theoretical accounts (Freeman et al., 2002; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & 
Bebbington, 2001). 
 
1.4 Anxiety, worry and delusion persistence 
Early findings demonstrating high prevalence of worry and anxiety in people with 
persecutory delusions (Freeman & Garety, 1999) and high levels of worry predicting 
delusion persistence over time (Startup, Freeman, & Garety, 2007) led to trials of a 
targeted worry intervention for people with persecutory delusions (Foster, Startup, 
Potts, & Freeman, 2010; Freeman, Dunn, Startup, & Kingdon, 2012). Researchers 
found that specifically treating worry, without directly addressing delusional beliefs, 
ameliorated not only worry but also the severity of delusions (Foster et al., 2010; 
Freeman, Dunn, et al., 2015) These findings support the proposal that anxiety-related 
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processes such as worry are involved in the maintenance of delusions, and can be 
targeted clinically to enable therapeutic change. 
 
1.5 Depression, negative beliefs about the self and 
delusion persistence 
Depression has been implicated as a key maintenance factor for persecutory 
delusions (Freeman et al., 2002). Specific associations between depression and 
persecutory delusions have been found in several studies (Ben-Zeev, Ellington, 
Swendsen, & Granholm, 2011; R. J. Drake et al., 2004; Fowler et al., 2012; Smith et 
al., 2006), but the mechanisms of this relationship are not fully known. Longitudinal 
studies have found that levels of depression and associated cognitive factors, such 
as negative beliefs about the self, predict the persistence of paranoia over time. In a 
prospective study of participants with persecutory delusions and schizophrenia 
spectrum diagnoses, Vorontsova et al. (2013) found that baseline levels of 
depression predicted 10% of the variance in paranoia six months later, over and 
above what could be predicted by baseline paranoia. Depression showed a 
significant association with negative beliefs about the self, and such beliefs were also 
predictive of paranoia persistence. Fowler et al. (2012) used multilevel modelling to 
analyse longitudinal relationships between negative schematic beliefs, low mood and 
paranoia over 12 months in 301 patients with psychosis. Cross-lagged effects (levels 
of one factor at one time predicting levels of another factor at a later point in time) 
were significant, and the most plausible models were those with pathways from 
depressive affect and negative beliefs to paranoia, not the other way around. Taken 
together, these findings support a role for depression and associated cognitive 
processes, such as negative beliefs about the self, in perpetuating distressing 
persecutory beliefs. The mechanisms underlying the relationship remain unclear, 
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however, and interventionist research will be necessary before causal effects can be 
confirmed.  
 
Demonstration of depression-related processes in delusion persistence could pave 
the way for further novel intervention routes, for example using behavioural activation 
for low mood (Mazzucchelli, Kane, & Rees, 2009; Waller et al., 2013), mindfulness-
based cognitive therapy (Chadwick, Taylor, & Abba, 2005; Segal, Williams, & 
Teasdale, 2012; van Aalderen et al., 2012) or self-esteem interventions (Fennell, 
1998; Hall & Tarrier, 2003). These interventions have demonstrated effectiveness in 
the treatment of depression (e.g. Cuijpers, van Straten, & Warmerdam, 2007; van 
Aalderen et al., 2012). A rationale for their appropriate application for people 
experiencing distressing persecutory beliefs could reveal a valuable further 
therapeutic potential: to reduce the distress and disability associated with persistent 
psychotic symptoms. The substantial comorbidity and correlations found between 
depression levels and persecutory delusion severity in people experiencing 
psychosis support the application of depression-focused techniques to therapeutic 
work with this group. 
 
1.6 Improving psychological therapy for persecutory 
delusions through depression-related processes 
Freeman and colleagues’ (2002) model was developed to be empirically testable and 
well-suited for use in the refinement of psychological therapies. Individual proposed 
maintenance factors included in the model can be studied empirically in relation to 
delusion persistence. Identification of evidence-based contributors can then be 
followed with targeted manipulation studies, leading towards randomised controlled 
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treatment trials for improved therapeutic techniques. Processes appropriate for 
therapeutic intervention are thus of particular interest to this research route.  
 
Taken together, the findings outlined above regarding the high prevalence of 
depression in people with psychosis, combined with evidence supporting the role of 
affective disturbances in the maintenance of psychotic symptoms, support the 
proposal that targeting depression, and cognitive factors associated with it, may be a 
fruitful approach to improving psychological therapies for people with persecutory 
delusions.  
 
CBT protocols for depression have been adapted to target analogous processes in 
people experiencing psychosis (Waller et al., 2014). Such treatments can include 
low-intensity cognitive-behavioural psychological therapies (e.g. Waller et al., 2013), 
recently in development, which aim to ameliorate depression in order to indirectly 
facilitate recovery from psychosis. A typical protocol for such an intervention might 
comprise eight weekly one-hour sessions, spent working towards a specific goal (e.g. 
to travel on the bus independently), using techniques of behavioural activation to 
tackle depression-related withdrawal. Such treatments offer the possibility of time-
limited, evidence-based and cost-effective interventions for people with psychosis, 
which can therefore be delivered to a greater number of those in need more rapidly 
than is possible with longer-term and higher-intensity therapies. Translating 
established findings from the field of depression to working with delusions can 
improve our understanding of the relationship between affective and psychotic 
disorders, as well as facilitating the extension of evidence-based treatments for 
people with distressing persecutory beliefs.  
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Explicitly targeting interventions towards ameliorating depression might also be a 
more effective way to work collaboratively with someone who holds delusional beliefs 
with high conviction than seeking to challenge or manipulate such beliefs directly. An 
encouraging example, with two cases, of therapeutic work reducing the effect of 
persecutory delusions without focusing on the belief content was reported by Ellett 
(2013). A six-session mindfulness based approach (adapted from mindfulness based 
cognitive therapy for depression) was used by the author to support the individuals in 
responding differently to internal experiences, and reductions were observed in levels 
of depression, anxiety and delusional dimensions (conviction, preoccupation, distress 
and functional impairment due to beliefs), which were maintained at one-month 
follow-up. These initial findings from two single cases must be interpreted with 
caution, but are consistent with a therapeutic effect on delusions of indirect 
depression-related therapeutic intervention. The mechanisms of the effect remain 
unclear, however, and merit further investigation. 
 
Specific depression-related processes are of interest as maintenance factors, and 
therefore potential targets for therapeutic development. A growing area of clinically-
relevant research regarding the psychology of depression and how it persists 
concerns goals, goal-directed behaviour and the motivations that drive such 
behaviour. Depression has been described as inherently a 'disorder of motivation' 
(Nesse, 2001), and is characterised by disruptions in hope, interest and behavioural 
drive (A. T. Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; World Health Organisation, 1992). Such 
motivational disruptions are a plausible mechanism by which depressive processes 
might also contribute to the persistence of distressing persecutory beliefs: it makes 
sense that individuals who are less motivated to strive for desired future states are 
less likely to come into contact with the richness of information in the environment to 
encourage belief re-evaluation. Emerging findings regarding, on the one hand, 
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depression-related features of personal goals (e.g. Sherratt & MacLeod, 2013) and, 
on the other hand, characteristics of personal goals that are found to predict gains in 
wellbeing and goal attainment over time (e.g. Sheldon & Elliot, 1999), have 
contributed to theoretical development and refinement of psychological therapies, 
which aim to harness individuals' motivations to empower them to make life changes 
that move them towards their valued goals.  
 
1.7 Definition and clinical significance of personal goals 
Various proposed definitions of personal goals have brought together cognitive, 
emotional and behavioural aspects of the construct.  Austin and Vancouver (1996) 
proposed a broad definition of goals as 'internal representations of desired states, 
where states are broadly construed as outcomes, events, or processes'. A key 
component of action intention that specifically characterises goals is captured by 
Cochran and Tesser's (1996) description: 'a cognitive image of an ideal stored in 
memory for comparison to an actual state; a representation of the future that 
influences the present; a desire (pleasure and satisfaction are expected from goal 
success); a source of motivation, an incentive to action' (p.100). Hierarchical 
structures of personal goals have been described (e.g. MacLeod, 2012), with 
generalised 'system concepts' or 'motive dispositions' (e.g. to be kind) at the highest, 
most abstract level, and concrete 'programs' or 'action intentions' (e.g. to call my 
mother today) at the lowest level. Most research has addressed an intermediate level 
of goals, sometimes referred to as 'personal strivings' (e.g. to qualify as a 
professional psychologist), which Emmons (1986) described as referring to 'what a 
person is characteristically trying to do,' which might bring together a number of 
lower-order actions towards a unifying purpose. 
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The study of goals in relation to achievement and productivity has a long history (e.g. 
Locke, 1968; Locke & Latham, 2002); however, findings relating aspects of goals to 
wellbeing and mental health are relatively recent. Some accounts have proposed that 
goals and goal-directed behaviour are in themselves crucial to mental health and 
wellbeing, and that the very process of striving for valued goals fulfils a basic human 
need for directedness and purpose (e.g. Schmuck & Sheldon, 2001). Other theorists 
have emphasised the multidimensional variability of personal goals, whose content, 
orientation and underlying motivations may differentially affect the wellbeing of those 
pursuing goals (MacLeod, 2012). Individuals may hold many goals in different life 
domains, and these may in turn be driven by diverse motivations. Motivations can 
include: approach motivations, directed to achieve a desired state that is not currently 
true; avoidance motivations, directed to prevent the occurrence of an undesired 
state; internally-driven motivations, relating to personal value or pleasure; and/or 
externally-driven motivations, relating to pleasing others or meeting situational 
demands. Empirical research has found that certain characteristics of people's 
personal goals show associations with positive and negative affect (Emmons, 1986) 
and with depression (Coats, Janoff-Bulman, & Alpert, 1996; Dickson & MacLeod, 
2004b, 2006; Sherratt & MacLeod, 2013). Longitudinal research has further 
demonstrated differential gains in wellbeing and achievement depending on the 
motivational characteristics of goals being pursued (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). These 
empirical findings are consistent with the possibility of a causal role for goal 
motivations in the course of depression over time. 
 
A brief targeted intervention (Goal setting And Planning; GAP) has recently been 
developed to improve mental health by supporting individuals to identify and plan for 
valued goals. This therapeutic approach has already shown promising effects, 
leading to increases in positive affect and reductions in depression (Coote & 
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MacLeod, 2012). A controlled trial of a four-session group-format GAP intervention 
delivered to a mixed group of 22 psychiatric patients including nine diagnosed  with 
schizophrenia (Farquharson & MacLeod, 2014) found that, compared to a control 
group, those receiving GAP experienced gains on measures of satisfaction with life 
and goal outcome expectancy, and reductions in self-reported negative affect. One-
month follow-up indicated improvements on measures of satisfaction with life, goal 
outcome expectancy, positive affect and hopelessness, although negative affect no 
longer showed significant improvement. These findings broadly support the proposal 
that goal-directed thinking and behaviour can, in and of themselves, be beneficial to 
wellbeing (Schmuck & Sheldon, 2001). Further optimisation of goal-orientated 
therapies will benefit from an increased understanding of the aspects of goals that 
functionally relate to clinical outcomes and wellbeing.  
 
Following findings that 'not all goals are created equal' in terms of their functional and 
affective sequelae (Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996), developments in 
knowledge regarding those aspects of goals that relate to wellbeing and depression 
will be relevant to the refinement of psychological therapies. The following sections 
will focus on the theoretical and empirical literature relating to the motivational 
orientation (approach vs. avoidance) and self-concordance (internal motivation vs. 
external motivation) of personal goals, as these two dimensions have arguably 
received the most empirical attention in association with depression (e.g. Ong & 
Phinney, 2002; Sherratt & MacLeod, 2013). Theoretical accounts that connect these 
aspects of goals with wellbeing and depression will be used to conceptualise feasible 
causal mechanisms. 
 
Early cognitive behavioural theory and therapy set out a role for goals in orienting 
subsequent behaviour (A. T. Beck, 1979; Clark & Beck, 1999), but motivational and 
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functional characteristics of different goals were not elaborated, nor any associations 
between goal characteristics and psychological difficulties. Recent research into the 
significance for clinical psychology of personal goals has therefore drawn on other 
strands of theory and research in psychology: notably self-regulation accounts such 
as Perceptual Control Theory (PCT; Powers, 1973) and the motivation-focused Self-
Determination Theory (SDT; Ryan & Deci, 2000). These theories, with accompanying 
bodies of empirical research, have conceptualised individuals' intentionality and 
motivation more comprehensively than traditional behavioural and cognitive models. 
Perceptual Control Theory and Self-Determination Theory place more emphasis on 
goal motivational orientation (approach vs. avoidance) and self-concordance 
(internally vs. externally driven motivation), respectively.  
 
1.7.1 Perceptual Control Theory 
Perceptual Control Theory (PCT; Powers, 1973) positions goals as a key central 
construct in the human process of self-regulation. It is a bottom-up dynamic model, 
which frames human behaviour as 'the control of perception,'  wherein certain 
internal reference values (goals, e.g. 'to have a clean home') are compared with 
perceived inputs from the environment (e.g. a perception of dirtiness in relation to 
one's home)  to trigger actions (e.g. cleaning) that cancel discrepancies between 
these values. PCT posits that control units, with their corresponding goals (reference 
values) are arranged hierarchically. The highest levels contain system concepts, 
such as representations of an ideal self and world, which influence lower levels. Units 
in descending middle levels represent values and goals of increasing specificity. At 
the lowest level lie control units that regulate tension in muscles, which translate into 
actions on the environment. As such actions impact the environment to reduce 
discrepancies between reference values and dynamically shifting perceptions, the 
control process brings the organism closer to its goals. Control of perceived inputs is 
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thus achieved using negative feedback loops in relation to hierarchies of goals, which 
may come into conflict with each other and undergo reorganisation as the individual 
interacts cyclically with the changing environment. Goals are therefore central to self-
regulation, along with the capacity to control perceived inputs. Stress is proposed to 
occur when individuals are restricted in altering perceived inputs in the direction of 
their goals (Carver & Scheier, 2008). The mechanistic logic of PCT has been 
extended to the conceptualisation of emotional experience and disorders of such 
(Carver & Scheier, 1990). Empirical studies have supported the PCT assertion that 
different goals that individuals hold predict their behaviours, including coping 
responses to stress, and are associated with longitudinal changes in levels of 
wellbeing (e.g. Elliot, Thrash, & Murayama, 2011).  
 
PCT has been criticised on the grounds that it is too mechanistic a model to explain 
adequately the dynamics of human motivation. For example, Bandura and Locke 
(2003) argued that PCT does not account for the body of evidence supporting a role 
for self-efficacy beliefs in influencing individuals' striving behaviour, associated affect 
and achievement (Bandura & Locke, 2003). Even advocates of the theory have 
pointed out limitations in empirically validating any gains in explanatory power of the 
model over others (Vancouver & Putka, 2000). Nevertheless, growing support for this 
explanatory framework has led to the development of a transdiagnostic therapeutic 
approach, named the Method Of Levels, which is based on PCT and works on 
clients' goals as its main focus, with promising results (Carey, 2008; Tai, 2009). In 
the context of the current study, PCT is relevant as a theoretical framework for 
understanding the functional importance of the distinction between two motivational 
subtypes of goals: approach goals and avoidance goals. 
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1.7.2 Approach goals and avoidance goals 
Approach goals relate to desired states that an individual wishes to move towards, 
and avoidance goals refer to undesired states that an individual seeks to avoid or 
minimise.  Approach goals have been proposed, according to feedback-based 
theories such as PCT, to facilitate more effective self-regulation than avoidance 
goals, because a feedback-based control system can respond readily to the 
approach and achievement of a positive goal state by reference to an internal 
representation of it, whereas monitoring the avoidance of an undesired state is 
never-ending, fails to generate any pattern of error reduction in its pursuit, and 
cannot ever reach a point of completion. This proposal is supported by findings that 
pursuit of more avoidant goals is associated with increased resource depletion over 
time, which may mediate an effect of avoidant goal striving on decreases in wellbeing 
(Oertig et al., 2013). 
 
A functional distinction between approach and avoidance motivations has been 
emphasised in multiple strands of psychological research (Elliot, 1999). This very 
distinction was made in Gray’s (1981; 1991) highly influential model of animal 
(including human) motivation, which posited two separate neurobiological systems 
for behavioural control: a Behavioural Activation System (BAS) and a Behavioural 
Inhibition System (BIS), with distinct physiological substrates. The BAS was 
proposed to respond to reward and appetitive stimuli, regulating feelings of 
happiness, desire and elation, and associated approach behaviours. The BIS was 
proposed to respond to punishment and aversive stimuli, regulating feelings of 
sadness, fear and anxiety, with associated avoidance behaviours and inhibition of 
activity. In the field of personality psychology, too, a very similar distinction was made 
between approach and avoidance motivations for understanding dispositional 
differences between individuals (Elliot & Covington, 2001; Elliot & Thrash, 2002).  
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Approach and avoidance motivational systems were proposed to contribute to 
psychopathology, either as mediators of the effects of positive or negative 
environments, or through variation between individuals in the reactivities of the 
systems (e.g. an individual with an over-sensitive avoidance system might respond to 
potentially threatening stimuli with a much higher anxiety and avoidance response 
than an individual with a less sensitive avoidance system). Both approach and 
avoidance motivational systems have been implicated in depression, with different 
theorists placing somewhat different emphasis on one or the other. Fowles (1988) 
proposed that a primary BAS deficit might underlie depression, which could 
subsequently lead to overactivation of the BIS. Interactive involvement of both BAS 
and BIS systems has been included in an integrative motivational model of 
depression (Trew, 2011). Consistent with theoretical accounts, depressed individuals 
have shown overactive BIS and underactive BAS responsiveness compared to non-
clinical controls (e.g. Kasch, Rottenberg, Arnow, & Gotlib, 2002). These differences 
in BIS and BAS responsiveness correspond with individuals having more avoidance 
personal goals and fewer approach goals, an association which may be mediated by 
self-esteem (Heimpel, Elliot, & Wood, 2006). 
 
Greater numbers of avoidance goals and fewer approach goals have been 
connected with depression and lower levels of subjective wellbeing. Most studies 
have used non-clinical samples, which necessitates caution in the extrapolation of 
these findings to clinical populations. Coats, Janoff-Bulman & Alpert (1996) coded as 
'approach' or 'avoidance' the self-generated personal goals of 81 students, and found 
that scores on a depression measure correlated significantly positively with numbers 
of avoidance goals and significantly negatively with numbers of approach goals. To 
strengthen their case for the functional effects of approach vs. avoidance 
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motivations, Coats and colleagues (1996) followed their first study with a second, in 
which they randomised 167 students to pursue the same goal framed either as 
approach ('be creative') or avoidance ('avoid being uncreative'). The results indicated 
that an avoidance frame resulted in significantly more negative and less positive self-
evaluations after completion of a performance task, compared to an approach frame. 
The effect was particularly strong for poor performers, indicating that the adoption of 
avoidance goals can result in negatively-valenced experiences that are strongest 
following unsuccessful task striving. Naturalistic longitudinal studies showing a 
predictive effect of avoidance goals on negative changes in subjective wellbeing over 
time add further support to the association between avoidance (as opposed to 
approach) goals and negative affective outcomes (Elliot & Church, 2002; Elliot & 
Sheldon, 1997; Elliot, Sheldon, & Church, 1997; Elliot et al., 2011). 
 
A negative association between depression scores and numbers of approach goals 
reported is particularly consistent among findings of non-clinical research, wherein 
several studies have used the same procedure for goal assessment (Dickson & 
MacLeod, 2004a, 2004b, 2006). Participants were asked to generate as many 
personal goals as possible in response to two prompts: 'In the future it will be 
important for me to…' and 'In the future it will be important for me to avoid…'. The 
goals were counted as sub-totals of 'approach' and 'avoidance' goals. A correlational 
non-clinical study of 16 to 18-year olds reported that higher depression scores were 
associated with fewer approach goals, while higher anxiety scores were associated 
with more avoidance goals (Dickson & MacLeod, 2004b). Dickson & MacLeod 
(2004a) administered this goal assessment task to four groups of adolescents 
selected, respectively, for high depression scores (Beck Depression Inventory [BDI] 
>=14, n=25), high anxiety scores (Beck Anxiety Inventory [BAI] >=14, n=27), high 
depression and anxiety (n=30) or low depression and anxiety ('controls,' n=30). The 
 Page 28 
authors found that high depression and high depression+anxiety groups generated 
significantly fewer approach goals (but no more avoidance goals) than the control 
group, and that the high anxiety group generated more avoidance (but no fewer 
approach) goals than the control group. Dickson & MacLeod (2006) reported similar 
results from a smaller study of adolescents, in which they compared a dysphoric 
subgroup (BDI > 21; n = 28) to a non-dysphoric subgroup (BDI < 8; n = 28) and found 
that the dysphoric group reported fewer approach and more avoidance goals than 
the non-dysphoric group. In summary, three studies with the same goal assessment 
procedure found higher non-clinical depression to be associated with fewer self-
reported approach goals, and one of the three also found dysphoria to be associated 
with more avoidance goals. 
 
1.7.3 Approach and avoidance goals in relation to clinical 
depression  
Studies comparing groups with clinical depression against non-clinical groups have 
produced mixed findings regarding associations between depression and numbers of 
approach and avoidance goals. Vergara and Roberts (2011) compared a group of 43 
participants who had recovered from depression to a group of 40 never-depressed 
controls, and found more avoidance goals given by the recovered group than the 
controls. No difference was found, however, in numbers of approach goals. The 
authors interpreted these findings as suggesting that holding avoidance goals may 
serve as a marker of depression vulnerability. Dickson, Moberly & Kinderman (2011) 
found no differences in numbers of approach or avoidance goals generated by a 
depressed group (n=23) compared to never-depressed controls (n=26). Dickson and 
colleagues' study had fewer participants, and therefore less power to detect 
significant differences. Their depressed group did produce more avoidance goals 
overall (M = 5.7, SD = 2.1) than controls (M = 4.8,  SD = 1.6), and it is possible that 
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the difference would have reached statistical significance if a larger participant 
sample had been used. Numbers of approach goals produced by the depressed 
participants (M = 6.8, SD =2.5) and controls (M = 6.5, SD = 1.9) were very similar, 
however, and did not differ in the hypothesised direction.  
 
1.7.4 Making sense of inconsistent findings: underlying 
motivation 
Both of the studies described above used Dickson & MacLeod's (2004a; b) goal 
assessment protocol, wherein participants are asked to generate as many goals as 
they can think of in each of two conditions: approach ('it will be important for me to...') 
and avoidance ('it will be important for me to avoid...'). The total number of goals 
produced under each condition is counted for subsequent analysis. In the context of 
a hierarchical system of goals and motivations (Elliot, 2006; MacLeod, 2012), this 
protocol only addresses one level: the approach-avoidance framing of the stated 
goal. This level of approach-avoidance motivation clearly has significant functional 
consequences, as demonstrated by Coats and colleagues' (1996) experimental 
findings. However, Elliot has emphasised the importance of considering motivation 
beyond the explicit level of approach-avoidance goal framing, in terms of the reasons 
for pursuit of goals. The same goal (e.g. 'to get a job') may be motivated by approach 
motivation (e.g. 'to use my skills to help others') or avoidance motivation (e.g. 'to stop 
my partner nagging me'), and these different motivations may colour pursuit of the 
goal quite differently: 'goal pursuit feels different and has different effects when it is 
impelled by different underlying motivations' (Elliot, 2006, p. 114). Assessment of 
underlying motivations for goals also allows a richer, dimensional picture of their 
motivational characteristics to be captured than a binary approach/avoidance goal 
distinction can allow: each goal may be driven by a number of approach motivations 
and/or a number of avoidance motivations. 
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Sherratt & MacLeod (2013) recently applied Elliot's (2006) line of thinking to address 
the inconsistency of previous findings regarding depression and approach and 
avoidance goals, by examining underlying motivations for goals. After generating 
goals in approach and avoidance conditions and picking two top goals in each 
condition, participants were asked what their reasons were for pursuing these goals, 
or why these goals were important to them. These motivations were themselves 
coded as representing approach or avoidance. The authors followed Elliot (2006) in 
emphasising this level of underlying motivation, over and above the importance of 
superficial goal framing. Sherratt and MacLeod found, like Dickson et al. (2011), that 
no significant differences were evident in the numbers of approach or avoidance 
goals generated by depressed (n=26) and non-depressed (n=33) groups. When 
asked about their reasons (motivations) for pursuing each stated goal, however, the 
depressed group showed significantly less approach motivation and more avoidance 
motivation for their approach goals than the non-depressed group. This finding 
suggests that asking individuals to explicitly generate goals in approach and 
avoidance categories without exploring underlying motivations may have obscured 
patterns in participants' goal motivations in previous studies, because goals may 
have been superficially framed as approach or avoidance to fit the task instructions, 
while underlying motivations may have been different. The motivations underlying 
approach goals in particular showed associations with depression in Sherratt and 
MacLeod's (2013) results, while motivations for avoidance goals showed no 
significant associations. Further research into personal goal characteristics of clinical 
groups is expected to benefit from eliciting and taking account of underlying 
motivations that individuals may report for their goals, as reported in the Sherratt & 
MacLeod (2013) study, beyond the superficial framing of goals as approach or 
avoidance. It will also be of interest to examine approach and avoidance goal 
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motivations alongside other depression-related indices, for example goal self-
concordance. The following sections introduce the concept of goal self-concordance 
(Sheldon & Elliot, 1999), alongside its theoretical source: self-determination theory 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
 
1.7.5 Self-Determination Theory and goal self-concordance 
Self-Determination Theory (SDT; Ryan & Deci, 2000) explains all human behaviour 
as lying on a continuum between heteronomy (externally regulated) and autonomy 
(internally regulated). The model includes a fundamental premise that the need to 
feel autonomous is one of three basic human psychological needs, alongside the 
need for perceived competence and the need to feel related. Autonomous or 
internally driven motivation (e.g. 'I want to learn a new language because it is 
inherently interesting and a valuable skill for me to develop') is therefore proposed to 
lead to greater application of effort, more persistence, higher quality performance and 
more positive subjective experience than externally driven motivation (e.g. 'I must 
learn this language because I was told that I should and I will feel guilty if I don't'). 
Thus a key motivational characteristic of goals for their functional effects, according 
to SDT, is their self-concordance: the extent to which they are internally rather than 
externally driven.  
 
Early forms of self-determination theory emphasised a functional distinction between 
'intrinsic' goals, which serve to meet an organism's fundamental needs (e.g. to learn 
to cook, to improve relationships with family), and 'extrinsic' goals, which aim to 
achieve external rewards (e.g. to earn more money, to become famous), but may not 
lead to fundamental needs being met (e.g. Deci, 1975; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Empirical 
research found the pursuit of extrinsic, as opposed to intrinsic, goals to be associated 
with lower wellbeing and less optimal functioning (e.g. Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996; 
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R. M. Ryan, 1999). A binary distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goals proved 
too simplistic, however (Sheldon, Williams, & Joiner, 2008). Cross-cultural 
researchers argued for the functional importance of the motivations underlying goal 
pursuit, beyond the face content. For example, individuals in developing countries 
with very restrictive financial circumstances might strive for material gains in order to 
meet basic organismic needs, rather than for external acclaim, and this striving would 
not be expected to act detrimentally upon their adaptive functioning (Brdar, Rijavec, 
& Miljković, 2009). Self-determination theory has since developed to emphasise the 
autonomy of the underlying motivations for goals - this is termed the goals' self-
concordance, and corresponds to the internal vs. external locus of causality for goal 
pursuit (Sheldon et al., 2008).  
 
The self-concordance of goals is defined as the extent to which they are driven by 
internal motivations of enjoyment or personal value, as opposed to external demands 
imposed upon the individual. Sheldon and Elliot (1999) distinguished between four 
types of motivation for goals, listed here in order of increasing self-concordance: 
 
1. Externally motivated (e.g. 'My doctor wants me to take my medication.') 
2. Introjected (e.g. 'I will feel guilty for letting someone down if I do not attend my 
appointment.') 
3. Identified (e.g. 'It is important to me to look after my personal care, as I value 
health and independence.') 
4. Intrinsically motivated (e.g. 'I want to paint pictures because I enjoy doing it.') 
 
Goal self-concordance can be measured by asking participants to rate on a Likert 
scale the extent to which they agree with each of four statements, corresponding 
respectively to each of the motivational goal types summarised above: 
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1. You pursue this goal because somebody else wants you to or because the 
situation demands it. 
2. You pursue this goal because you would feel ashamed, guilty or anxious if you 
didn’t. 
3. You pursue this goal because you really believe that it’s an important goal to have. 
4. You pursue this goal because of the fun and enjoyment that it provides you. 
 
Following Sheldon and Elliot (1999), a total self-concordance score can then be 
calculated by subtracting each participant's scores for the first two questions from 
their summed score for the third and fourth questions. A dimensional measure of goal 
self-concordance, corresponding to motivational autonomy, is thereby derived. 
 
Self-concordance of personal goals has shown a positive association with positive 
self-regard (Judge, Bono, Erez, & Locke, 2005) and goal attainment (Koestner, 
Lekes, Powers, & Chicoine, 2002). Sheldon & Elliot (1999) integrated findings from 
three longitudinal datasets, totalling 394 college student participants, to demonstrate 
that individuals pursuing more self-concordant goals put more sustained effort into 
goal pursuit, were more successful in attaining their goals and experienced greater 
wellbeing gains from goal pursuit than those pursuing less self-concordant goals. 
Sheldon et al. (2004) reported the results of a further set of three studies of college 
students, the results of which showed that goal self-concordance (autonomy) was 
associated with subjective wellbeing cross-sectionally, and predicted positive 
increases in wellbeing prospectively over a one-year follow-up period. The predictive 
effect of goal self-concordance remained when changes in income were controlled. 
These longitudinal findings add weight to the assertion that goal self-concordance is 
a significant contributor to positive affective experiences over time, although causality 
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cannot be conclusively established in the absence of studies using experimental 
designs.  
 
Two studies have examined associations of goal self-concordance with depression. 
Ong and Phinney (2002) examined personal goals, self-concordance and depression 
in groups of European American (N = 155) and Vietnamese American (N = 121) 
college students. They found that the Vietnamese American group had significantly 
lower goal self-concordance and significantly higher depression scores than the 
European American group, and that self-concordance accounted for the differences 
in depression levels between the two groups. Sherratt (2011) compared goal self-
concordance of depressed and non-clinical participant groups, and found, as 
hypothesised, that the goals of depressed participants were significantly less self-
concordant than those of the non-clinical group. Both of these studies' findings 
therefore support a proposed association between low goal self-concordance and 
depression.  It will be important to replicate these findings in further groups of 
individuals, including those with other diagnoses, to assess generalisability of the 
results.  
 
One further study administered the four items of Sheldon and Elliot's (1999) self-
concordance measure to 136 undergraduate students, but instead of calculating a 
composite self-concordance index, examined the associations of the individual items 
with scores on measures of depression and anxiety (Winch, Moberly, & Dickson, 
2014). Winch and colleagues found that for approach (rather than avoidance) goals, 
higher depression scores were associated with significantly fewer intrinsic 
motivations, more identified motivations, more introjected motivations and more 
external motivations. For avoidance goals, higher depression scores were only 
significantly associated with more external motivations. These findings are broadly in 
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line with self-determination theory predictions: four of the five significant correlations 
were in the direction that would support an association between higher depression 
scores and lower self-concordance. It is also notable that motivations for approach-
framed goals showed more significant associations with depression scores than 
those for avoidance-framed goals, as was the case in Sherratt and MacLeod's (2013) 
findings. 
 
There is a promising possibility of therapeutically increasing goal self-concordance to 
determine if benefits, such as reduced depression scores and/or gains in goal 
attainment, might result. Sheldon and colleagues developed an intervention to train 
participants in self-congruent goal-setting, which has been trialled in a study of 90 
college students (Sheldon, Kasser, Smith, & Share, 2002). This initial study found 
benefits of the intervention in terms of goal self-concordance and subjective 
wellbeing, but only for those participants who were already relatively high in goal self-
concordance at the start. Clearly there remains much work to be done in applying 
self-determination theory and goal self-concordance research to helping individuals 
who may experience the consequences of low-self-concordant goal striving. One 
possible clinical application of the knowledge base regarding goal self-concordance 
would be to the selection and prioritisation of therapy goals, which are chosen at the 
start of cognitive-behavioural treatments, and used to orientate subsequent 
techniques (e.g. J. S. Beck, 2011). 
 
1.8 The role of goals in cognitive behavioural therapies 
A common feature of cognitive behavioural treatments, including both high-intensity 
and low-intensity therapies, is their goal-focused orientation (J. S. Beck, 2011; 
Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Chamberlain, & Dunn, 1994; Papworth, Marrinan, & Martin, 
2013). The consideration of conscious goals and their motivational functions was 
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absent from early behavioural theories of psychological functioning (Locke & Latham, 
2002; e.g. Watson, 1924), which located motivations outside the individual, in the 
form of rewards and punishments. Beck's cognitive model of depression (e.g. A. T. 
Beck, 1979; Clark & Beck, 1999), which laid the foundations for much of 
contemporary cognitive behavioural therapy, conceptualised goals as part of a 
'secondary,' 'constructive' level of information processing system, as opposed to the 
'primary,' 'survival-oriented' level on which depressogenic schemas of self and world 
were proposed to operate. Cognitive therapy in this frame aims to move the 
individual from a state of information processing dominated by overactivity in 
dysregulated primary structures to increasing activity in the secondary, constructive 
structures, which include personal goals. Identification of appropriate goals is 
prioritised from the start of therapy, and progress towards these goals can 
subsequently be implemented and monitored in a relatively manualised fashion. Goal 
setting is now widely acknowledged to be an important part not only of psychological 
therapies, but also of more broadly conceptualised casework with people 
experiencing mental health problems (e.g. Ades & Clarke, 2003; Lecomte, Wallace, 
Perreault, & Caron, 2005).  
 
In the clinical experience of the author, some cases of individuals not responding to 
cognitive behavioural therapy have been attributed to goals being selected that were 
not motivating for the client. Progress towards goals often requires behavioural 
changes which are initially aversive, such as entering feared situations to habituate 
anxiety (graded exposure) or overcoming fatigue to initiate new activities in order to 
increase environmental reward (behavioural activation). The capacity of individuals 
and their therapists to access personally meaningful and motivating goals is crucial to 
the orientation and progress of any such intervention, as goals without sufficient 
motivational value are unlikely to make it worth tolerating the initial aversiveness of 
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the necessary behavioural changes. Clients themselves will be central to the 
identification of goals that will motivate them, but therapists also play a part in this 
collaborative process, and as such it is worth considering how this may be done most 
helpfully (e.g. Nezu & Nezu, 1993) 
 
Goals held by clients in therapy have been found to differ considerably from the goals 
that their therapists see as appropriate for them (e.g. Thompson & Zimmerman, 
1969), reflecting understandable differences in perspective, which may remain 
despite efforts towards collaboration. The priorities and needs associated with 
service contexts may also influence clinicians' perspectives on appropriate goals. For 
example, mental health services might seek to prioritise certain goals, such as 
medication adherence or re-commencing employment, that serve the stated aims of 
the service or its expectations of the best interests of the service user, but may not at 
that time be inherently motivating for the individual in question. Emphasis has been 
placed on the therapeutic importance of agreement between the goals of service 
users and clinicians (Clarke, Oades, Crowe, & Deane, 2006; Fischer, Shumway, & 
Owen, 2002), following empirical findings that goal agreement between client and 
therapist is significantly associated with positive outcomes, including reduced 
symptoms, decreased distress and increased satisfaction (e.g. Long, 2001; Michalak, 
Klappheck, & Kosfelder, 2004). In a meta-analysis of 15 therapy studies published 
between 2000 and 2009, Tryon and Winograd (2011) examined goal agreement 
between client and therapist, as well as outcomes, including client retention in 
treatment, symptom reduction, and adaptive functioning, and reported  an overall 
effect size of 0.34 (SD = .19) for the positive association between goal agreement 
and positive therapeutic outcome.   
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 A strong consensus on the importance of goal agreement between service user and 
provider leaves another question open: what kinds of goals may be expected to lead 
to positive outcomes? Individuals may have many different goals in assorted different 
life domains at any point in time (Emmons, 2003). The conversation that takes place 
between a service user and therapist at the time when goals are identified therefore 
has considerable scope for variability in how and which goals may be prioritised. The 
clinician's participation in the collaborative goal-setting process involves contributing 
to the selection and prioritisation of goals, and it is therefore of interest how this might 
be directed in the service of the client’s best interests (Nezu & Nezu, 1993). People 
experiencing psychosis are typically thought to require some support and direction 
from clinicians in identifying appropriate goals for recovery (Lecomte et al., 2005; 
Rudnick, 2002). A particular concern has been raised, as articulated by Rudnick 
(2002), that individuals with 'serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia' (p. 310) 
may wish to set goals that 'not only reflect values that are in conflict with values held 
by mental health practitioners or society at large but that may also be induced by 
mental impairment' (p. 311). In an ethical analysis of the appropriateness of pursuing 
client-selected goals in psychiatric rehabilitation, Rudnick came to the conclusion that 
client-selected goals should be pursued unless, either, this may be dangerous, or the 
goals are 'induced by severe mental impairment' (p. 310). It is not clear, however, 
how it may be identified whether or not any given goal is 'induced by severe mental 
impairment'. A collaborative goal-setting process in therapy may be disrupted for 
clients with psychosis by perceptions that their goals may be driven by psychotic 
symptoms such as delusions and thought disorder.  
 
1.9 Goals of people with delusions 
To date, no published research exists which examines the personal goals of people 
selected for the presence of persecutory delusions specifically. A search was 
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therefore conducted for studies regarding the goals of people with delusions in 
general, including persecutory delusions, as well as other content types. A search of 
the MEDLINE and PsycINFO databases for published studies  dated up to the first 
week of February 2015 using the keywords (delusion* OR persecut* OR paranoi*) 
AND (goal OR goals) returned 636 results.  The titles and abstracts of these were 
examined for empirical studies that selected people with delusions and examined the 
content of their personal goals. Two such studies were found (Jakes, Rhodes, & Issa, 
2004; Rhodes & Jakes, 2000). Both of these studies had relatively small sample 
sizes (20 and 14, respectively) and concerned qualitative associations between the 
content of participants' delusions and the key problems and goals they identified in 
their lives, rather than any motivational or functional properties of goals. The 
backdrop to these two studies is the historical debate as to whether or not delusions 
have psychological 'meaning' (e.g. Berrios, 1991) and the question of where the 
content of delusional beliefs might originate from (e.g. Forgus & DeWolfe, 1974). 
 
Rhodes and Jakes (2000) conducted an interpretative phenomenological analysis 
(IPA) of life problems and goals given by 14 participants, who were selected for the 
presence of delusions. The majority of these had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, 
some with manic-depression and some with delusional disorder. Responses 
regarding life problems and goals were elicited using the questions 'What do you 
consider to be the main problems/difficulties in your life? Now? And over long periods 
of your life?' and 'If you achieve or find etc. (the things discussed above) what 
advantages will that bring to you?' No explicit distinction was made between enquiry 
regarding life problems and that regarding goals in this study, and the two constructs 
were conceptualised as relatively continuous, with goals seen as reflecting desires to 
solve problems. Rhodes and Jakes used IPA to code and organise the material 
gathered according to themes, which the authors grouped into six main categories. 
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These were: Social (e.g. relationships, interaction with others), Competence (e.g. 
work, hobbies), Experiential base (e.g. physical or mental suffering, positive 
experiences of calm or wellbeing), Material base (e.g. money or accommodation), 
Direction (e.g. desire to keep moving in one direction, religious or philosophical 
aspirations) and Evaluation (e.g. self-evaluation, evaluation in relation to others). 
Subsequent thematic analysis of participants' delusional beliefs led the authors to 
draw thematic connections between the content of delusions and life problems/goals 
of their participants. They argued therefore that delusional talk is expressive, and 
attempts to describe a person's lived experience in some way. Rhodes and Jakes 
explicitly ruled out any inferences from their study findings regarding the functional 
characteristics of delusions or personal goals. 
 
Jakes et al. (2004) interviewed 20 participants with delusions about their delusional 
beliefs and about their life problems and goals, using a similar procedure to Rhodes 
and Jakes (2000). IPA was also used to code and classify the content of participants' 
problems and goals, with five resulting key themes: Intimacy (e.g. relationships, love 
and sex), Achievement (e.g. wanting success or to lead others), Social alienation 
(e.g. feeling unlike others or looked down upon), Control aversion (e.g. unease due 
to perceived control by others, wanting to escape) and Basic fear (e.g. of illness, 
accidents, death). Jakes and colleagues classified the life problems and goals of 
each person into just one of these categories as a main theme, while two other raters 
independently classified the same participants' delusional beliefs according to the 
same set of five categories. Statistically significant agreement was found between 
the themes of participants' delusions and of their life problems/goals, with Kappa 
coefficients of .44 (p < .01) for one rater and .61 (p < .01) for another. The authors 
considered a number of explanations for this association, including that delusions 
might emerge as an expression of underlying life problems, or that particular 
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environmental circumstances and events might cause an individual to develop 
corresponding problems, goals and delusional themes. The possibility that 
participants' delusions might have driven their expressions of goals was discredited 
by the finding that in no cases did life problems or goals explicitly relate to the 
delusion, and in several cases the life problems and goals preceded the development 
of delusions by years. As with the Rhodes and Jakes study (2000), no examination 
was made of the functional or motivational characteristics of participants' goals. It 
would be of interest to know more about the motivational characteristics of the 
personal goals of people with delusions, and any quantitative associations between 
these and symptoms, as has been examined for people with depression (e.g. 
Sherratt & MacLeod, 2013). A greater understanding of these motivational features 
can also help to guide the development of increasingly effective therapies, which take 
into account the kinds of goals that will best motivate individuals to engage in 
therapeutic change. 
 
1.10  Summary 
The ongoing development of psychological therapies for people with persecutory 
delusions is served by the application of techniques to target specific processes 
associated with depression and anxiety, which are known maintenance factors. 
Accessibility of personally motivating goals is a candidate factor underlying the effect 
of depression on delusion persistence. Goal motivations are both theoretically 
implicated and clinically relevant to the refinement of psychological therapies. The 
empirical findings available support theoretical assertions that the types of personal 
goals accessible to individuals and the motivations held for such goals are 
associated with clinically relevant outcomes, in particular depression, wellbeing and 
functional effectiveness. Causality cannot be unequivocally established from the 
available evidence, and it will be particularly important to proceed with caution in 
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extending research from non-clinical to clinical populations, where this has not yet 
taken place. It seems probable that causality in the relationship between affective 
disturbance and personal goals is bidirectional: depression might make motivating 
goals less accessible, and the non-accessibility of motivating goals might in turn 
perpetuate depression, creating a vicious cycle. The goal-focused orientation of 
evidence-based psychological treatments for affective disturbances such as CBT 
offers a vehicle for therapeutically interrupting such vicious cycles at the goal-
clarification and goal-pursuit stages. No studies published to date have 
systematically examined quantitative associations between symptoms and the goals 
and motivations of people with persecutory delusions. In order to facilitate extending 
the application of goal-focused therapies to people experiencing persecutory 
delusions, it is first necessary to develop our understanding of personally motivating 
goals identified by this group, and how they relate to symptoms and cognitive 
processes. An improved understanding of the goals and motivations of people with 
persecutory delusions, and how these relate to symptoms, can facilitate an increased 
understanding of the relationship between affective and psychotic disturbances, as 
well as further therapeutic developments. A study was therefore designed to examine 
personal goals and motivations in this group, and to investigate associations with 
symptoms.  
 
1.11 Aims and hypotheses of the study  
The current study’s novel and innovative contribution to the literature is the merger of 
two previously separate foci of investigation: (1) the study of persecutory delusions 
and depression-related processes contributing to their persistence, and (2) the study 
of personal goals, their motivational characteristics and how these relate to 
depression. Therefore, the study reported in this thesis examined, firstly, the 
phenomenological profile of personal goals identified by a group of participants 
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experiencing current persecutory delusions, and, secondly, examined associations of 
goal motivations with symptoms and cognitive processes, with the aim of facilitating 
refinement of psychological therapies. The study recruited a sample of individuals 
with current persecutory delusions, and the following hypotheses were tested:  
 
1. The number of approach motivations for goals will be negatively associated 
with levels of depression. 
2. The number of avoidance motivations for goals will be positively associated 
with levels of depression. 
3. The self-concordance of goals will be negatively associated with levels of 
depression.   
Associations of goal motivations and self-concordance with paranoia, anxiety, 
schematic beliefs and worry were also examined.
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Chapter 2. Methods 
2.1 Design 
A cross-sectional cohort design was used, to test associations between variables 
within a single sample of participants with persecutory delusions. The key variables 
of interest were personal goals, goal motivations (approach motivations and 
avoidance motivations), goal self-concordance and levels of depression. The main 
analyses examined associations of depression levels with approach motivations, 
avoidance motivations and goal self-concordance, to test the study hypotheses. 
Associations of goal motivations and self-concordance with anxiety, paranoia, worry 
and schematic belief scores were also examined. 
 
2.2 Participants 
2.2.1 Power analysis 
No study is known to have reported a correlational analysis of goal 
approach/avoidance motivations and depression in a clinical group, so the power 
calculation is based on effect sizes of published group comparisons. Sherratt & 
MacLeod (2013) compared mean numbers of approach and avoidance motivations 
given for approach and avoidance goals by depressed and non-clinical groups. They 
reported significant differences in types of motivation for approach goals: the 
depressed group gave significantly more avoidance motivations, d = 1.02, and fewer 
approach motivations, d = 0.67, than the non-clinical group. These correspond to 
medium-to-large effect sizes. In order to achieve 80% power to detect a correlation of 
.50, the lower end of a large effect size (Cohen, 1992) with a .05 two-tailed 
significance level, a sample of 29 patients with delusions would be required. 
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2.2.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
The study inclusion criteria were twofold: current persecutory delusion(s) and a 
primary diagnosis of schizophrenia-spectrum disorder. Persecutory delusions were 
defined as by Freeman and Garety (2000): that the individual believes that harm is 
occurring, or is going to occur, to him or her, and that the individual believes that the 
persecutor has the intention to cause harm. Diagnoses included schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, delusional disorder and unspecified functional psychosis, 
the latter being a common diagnosis given to people in the early stages of treatment 
for psychotic experiences. The presence of current persecutory delusion(s) and 
appropriate symptom profile for a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis were confirmed 
using the semi-structured clinical interview Schedules for Clinical Assessment in 
Neuropsychiatry (SCAN) version 2.1 (World Health Organisation, 1998). 
 
Individuals were excluded from participation if they had any organic brain disorder or 
primary substance abuse disorder, or if they were unable to give informed consent or 
possessed an insufficient grasp of the English Language to complete the measures.  
 
Participants were not selected for depression status, and a spread of depression 
scores was expected. Other co-occurring diagnoses were not used to exclude people 
from participation, as long as the primary diagnosis was a schizophrenia-spectrum 
disorder. 
 
2.2.3 Sample 
All participants were recruited from outpatient secondary care mental health services 
in London. Early Intervention Services and Recovery Teams were approached to 
identify appropriate individuals. Clinical teams referred 78 individuals in total, who 
they believed to be suitable for the study. The researcher was able to contact 47 
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individuals, who were sent information sheets to consider study participation. Of 
these 47 people, eight were excluded as not having current persecutory delusions, 
six declined to participate due to time considerations or reluctance to talk, and 33 
consented to take part in the study. One of these 33 individuals was excluded from 
the study partway through completing the measures, as he was unable to 
concentrate sufficiently to rate the questionnaire items.  A further two individuals who 
consented to take part withdrew from the study, as they did not wish to continue.  
Therefore, the total sample size for the study was 30 participants. Of these, 15 were 
under the care of Early Intervention Services and 15 were under the care of 
Recovery Teams.   
 
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) 
Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) were administered before and after the assessment 
procedure. Participants were asked to rate each of three mood items ('How anxious 
do you feel right now?' 'How sad do you feel right now?' and 'How happy do you feel 
right now?') by drawing a mark through a 10cm horizontal scale, which was then 
converted by measurement to a score 0 - 100. This method has been used in studies 
of people with psychosis as a measure of mood changes occurring over the course 
of an intervention (e.g. Freeman, Waller, et al., 2015). Any changes in mood ratings 
over the course of the present assessment procedure were used as an index of the 
acceptability of the process. 
 
2.3.2 Clinical symptom interviews 
Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN) version 2.1 (World 
Health Organisation, 1998). The SCAN 2.1 is a system of semi-structured clinician 
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rated interview schedules for psychiatric diagnosis, developed by the World Health 
Organisation. The system is based around the Present State Examination, version 
10.2 (PSE-10.2). Part 1 contains items relating to anxiety and affective disorders, and 
Part 2 covers psychotic and cognitive processes. Items are scored according to the 
intensity, frequency and duration of individual symptoms or experiences, which are 
cross-examined using definitions given in the glossary that accompanies the manual. 
Rating scales vary between items in different parts of the examination. Most items in 
Part 1 are rated according to a combination of frequency and severity, and most 
items in Part 2 are rated according to frequency. Particular items refer to distress and 
functional impairment caused by symptoms. The system permits classification of both 
current and lifetime psychiatric disorders according to DSM-IV or ICD-10  criteria. A 
computer package, iShell, available to trained examiners, allows input of item ratings, 
which then undergo processing with the appropriate algorithms and produce a set of 
diagnoses.  
 
Inter-rater reliability coefficients for SCAN diagnoses were not calculated in the 
present study: all classifications were made by the same experimenter (NV), to check 
study eligibility, in the context of clinical diagnoses having already been made by 
each participant's Consultant Psychiatrist. The present experimenter (NV) completed 
the week-long formal training in the use of the SCAN over the period 9th – 13th 
November 2009 at the WHO-accredited training centre at Nottingham University. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that trained interviewers can administer the 
SCAN reliably (e.g. Rijnders et al., 2000). Inter-rater agreement between assessors 
in Rijnders and colleagues' study ranged between 87% (for diagnostic group 
classification) and 94% (for diagnostic caseness classification). Test-retest reliability 
over three months was reported as κ = .64 for diagnostic caseness and κ = .52 for 
current depression, which correspond to 'substantial' and 'moderate' agreement, 
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respectively, according to conventions set out by Landis and Koch (1977). 
Vorontsova et al. (2013) reported high inter-rater agreement (93% agreement on 
diagnoses, κ = .86), one of the raters being the present experimenter (NV), using the 
SCAN in a study of individuals experiencing persecutory delusions.  
 
In the current study, all sections of the SCAN 2.1 were included which are used in the 
assessment of schizophrenia spectrum disorders and of major depression. The key 
sections for the present purpose were as follows:  
 
Section 6 (Depressed mood and ideation)  
Section 7 (Thinking, concentration, energy, interests)  
Section 8 (Bodily functions)  
Section 10 (Expansive mood and ideation, to rule out a bipolar symptom profile) 
Section 17 (Hallucinations) 
Section 18 (Thought disorder and replacement of will) 
Section 19 (Delusions) 
Section 22 (Motor and behavioural items) 
Section 23 (Affect) 
 
Several items from Section 3 (Worrying, tension) were also included, as well as some 
checklist items regarding past history and course of illness over time. The numbers of 
items administered varied between participants according to presentation, because 
the procedure for most sections is to discontinue if answers to initial screening 
questions are negative. For example, in Section 7, if the examinee denies 
experiencing any difficulty over the last month with thinking, concentration, energy or 
interests, further detailed questions about these kinds of difficulties are not asked, 
and the examination continues to Section 8. The diagnostic interviews were voice 
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recorded for all participants who consented. The SCAN was used to verify that 
participants met diagnostic criteria for a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder, and to 
establish which of the participants with delusions also met diagnostic criteria for 
concurrent depression. 
 
Psychotic SYmptoms RATing Scales (PSYRATS; Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier, & 
Faragher, 1999). The PSYRATS is a 17-item instrument rating the multidimensional 
severity of delusions (6 items) and hallucinations (11 items). Each item is given a 
rating from 0 to 4.  Only the six-item Delusions Scale was used here, which has a 
total score range of 0 - 24. These items relate to delusional conviction, preoccupation 
(frequency and duration), distress (frequency and intensity) and functional 
impairment. The instrument has demonstrated very good inter-rater reliability (intra-
class correlation coefficients ranging from .79 to 1.0) and test-retest reliability (intra-
class correlation coefficient .70). Drake and colleagues assessed the PSYRATS 
Delusions Scale's internal consistency in a first-episode psychosis sample by 
calculating correlation coefficients between each item and the subscale score minus 
that item, with resulting coefficients ranging between .17 and .41 (R. Drake, 
Haddock, Tarrier, Bentall, & Lewis, 2007).  
 
Two percentage rating items were added to the PSYRATS Delusions Scale to 
measure in more detail the two main delusion dimensions of interest, as has been 
done in previous studies (e.g. Vorontsova et al., 2013). The items concerned 
delusional conviction and delusional distress: each was rated as a percentage from 0 
to 100. These ratings are reported separately from the Delusions Scale totals. 
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2.3.3 Clinical symptom questionnaires 
Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS; Green et al., 2008). The GPTS is a 
32-item self-report measure of paranoid thoughts over the last month, split into two 
parts. Part A assesses ideas of reference (e.g. 'People have been dropping hints for 
me') and Part B assesses ideas of persecution (e.g. 'I was sure someone wanted to 
hurt me'). Each part contains subscales for conviction, preoccupation and distress 
related to paranoid thoughts. Items are rated on a 1-5 scale, with higher numbers 
indicating a greater level of paranoid thinking. Total scores range from 32 to 160. The 
GPTS was developed explicitly for consistency with Freeman & Garety’s (2000) 
definition of a persecutory delusion, and with the content of diagnostic questions 
used in the SCAN interview. Good internal consistency was found when used with 
patients with persecutory delusions (α = .90) and non-clinical controls (α = .95). High 
test-retest reliability was also found (intra-class correlation coefficient = 0.87 over a 
two week interval). Convergent validity was supported by correlations with other 
questionnaire measures of paranoia and delusional ideation. Total GPTS scores 
were significantly positively correlated with scores on the Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein 
& Vanable, 1992), r = .81, p < .01, for patients with delusions and r = .71, p < .01, for 
non-clinical controls. GPTS scores were also significantly positively correlated with 
scores on the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999), r = 
.39, p < .01, for patients with delusions and  r = .39, p < .01, for non-clinical controls. 
In those with persecutory delusions, subscale scores also showed appropriate 
associations with corresponding item scores on the PSYRATS interviewer-rated 
Delusions Scale (Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier, & Faragher, 1999), and clinical 
change over six months from baseline assessment was captured by changes in 
scores that correlated significantly with PSYRATS change scores (Green et al., 
2008). In the present study, Cronbach's α for the GPTS was calculated as = .94. 
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Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; A. T. Beck et al., 1996). The BDI is a 21-item self-
report measure of the cognitive, affective and somatic symptoms of depression. Each 
item is rated between 0 and 3, according to how severely the respondent has been 
affected by each symptom over the past two weeks. Total scores can therefore range 
from 0 to 63. Cut-off scores for clinical interpretation have been provided as follows: 
0 - 13, minimal depression; 14 - 19, mild depression; 20 - 28, moderate depression; 
29 - 63, severe depression. The BDI has shown good internal consistency (α = .84), 
moderate-high test-retest reliability (intra-class correlation coefficients from .48 to 
.86) and good concurrent validity with clinician-rated measures of depression. The 
BDI has been used to measure depression in previous studies of people 
experiencing persecutory delusions (e.g. Vorontsova et al., 2013). When 
administered to groups of people with psychosis, the correlation of the BDI with the 
psychosis-specific Calgary Depression Scale for Schizophrenia (CDSS; Addington, 
Addington, & Maticka-Tyndale, 1993) has been reported as approaching unity: r = 
.91 (Birchwood et al., 2000). In the present study, Cronbach's α for the BDI was 
calculated as = .82. 
 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; A. T. Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). The BAI is 
a 21-item self-report measure of the cognitive and physiological symptoms of anxiety. 
Participants rate the items (e.g. 'Heart pounding or racing'; 'Fear of losing control') 
according to how severely they have been bothered by each experience over the 
previous week (0 = not at all bothered, 1 = mildly, 2 = moderately, 3 = severely). 
Total scores can therefore range from 0 to 63. Cut-off scores for clinical interpretation 
have been provided as follows: 0 - 7, minimal anxiety; 8 - 15, mild anxiety; 16 - 25, 
moderate anxiety; 26 - 63, severe anxiety. The BAI has demonstrated high internal 
consistency (α = .92) and test-retest reliability over a week (r = .75). The BAI has 
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been used to measure anxiety in previous studies of individuals with persecutory 
delusions (e.g. Startup et al., 2007; Vorontsova et al., 2013), and BAI scores have 
shown significant associations with paranoia: Green et al. (2008) found r = .41 
between the BAI and GPTS scores, and r = .42 between the BAI and Paranoia Scale 
(Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) scores. In the present study, Cronbach's α for the BAI 
was calculated as = .92. 
 
2.3.4 Cognitive measures 
Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS; Fowler et al., 2006). The BCSS contain 4 
subscales of 6 items, each scored on a 0-4 scale (range 0-24 for each subscale), 
which assess endorsement of beliefs in four categories: Positive Self, Negative Self, 
Positive Other and Negative Other. Higher scores indicate greater belief 
endorsement. These scales were developed with non-clinical and psychosis groups, 
where the subscales demonstrated high internal consistency (α between .78 - .88), 
good convergent and discriminant validity in relation to associated measures, and 
encouraging test-retest reliability over 3 weeks (r between .70 - .84). Negative Self 
scores are thought to measure schematic beliefs relating to fault and/or vulnerability, 
which are thought to contribute to the formation and maintenance of persecutory 
beliefs (Freeman et al., 2002), and have been found to predict paranoia longitudinally 
(Fowler et al., 2012; Vorontsova et al., 2013). In the present study, Cronbach's α for 
the BCSS subscales were calculated as the following: Positive Self α = .85, Negative 
Self α = .82, Positive Other α = .93, Negative Other α = .88. 
 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). 
The PSWQ is the most established measure of trait worry style available, and has 
been used extensively in clinical and non-clinical populations. Items refer to the 
pervasiveness of worry across different situations (e.g. 'I am always worrying about 
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something'), the excessiveness of worry (e.g. 'my worries overwhelm me') and its 
uncontrollability (e.g. 'I know I should not worry about things, but I cannot help it'), 
reflecting the clinical profile of generalised anxiety disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). Each of the 16 items is rated on a 1-5 scale. Items 1, 3, 8, 10 and 
11 are reverse scored (e.g. item 8: 'I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts'). 
Total scores can range from 16 to 80, with higher scores indicating a greater 
tendency to worry. The PSWQ has demonstrated high internal consistency in clinical 
and non-clinical samples, with α values reported ranging between .86 - .95 (Brown, 
Antony, & Barlow, 1992; Meyer et al., 1990; van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 
1999). Good convergent and discriminant validity were also demonstrated in a study 
comprising 436 anxiety disorder patients (Brown et al., 1992) Worry has been 
implicated in the perpetuation of distressing persecutory beliefs (Freeman et al., 
2002), and has been shown to predict delusion persistence over time (Startup et al., 
2007). In the present study, Cronbach's α for the PSWQ was calculated as = .85. 
 
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR; Ginsberg, 2003). This test was developed 
and had normative data established alongside the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
- Third Edition (Wechsler, 1997). The WTAR was intended for the purpose of 
estimating adults' pre-morbid IQ, as it may have been before putative cognitive 
decline or brain damage. Participants are required to read aloud a list of 50 words 
with irregular pronunciations. The number of correct responses is used to derive an 
estimate of pre-morbid intellectual functioning. This was used to characterise the 
present participant sample's performance in relation to previous reports of studies of 
people with persecutory delusions (e.g. Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova, Antley, & 
Slater, 2010; Vorontsova et al., 2013). 
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FAS test (Benton & Hamsher, 1976). In this task, participants are given 60 seconds 
on each of three trials to generate as many words as possible starting with the letter 
F, then A, then S, excluding proper nouns and repetitions of the same word stem with 
a different suffix. Verbal fluency is measured by the sum of valid words produced in 
the three trials. Verbal fluency is considered a broad measure of executive control / 
working memory capacity (Dalgleish et al., 2007; Rosen & Engle, 1997). The FAS 
test was included in the present study in anticipation of a positive finding supporting 
the first hypothesis - of an association between higher depression scores and fewer 
approach motivations generated - which might be further strengthened if it could be 
shown to remain significant with verbal fluency statistically controlled in the analysis. 
 
2.3.5  Goals and motivations 
Goals were assessed by semi-structured interview, following Emmons' (1986) 
personal striving construct, as typically used in previous studies (e.g. Vincent, 
Boddana, & MacLeod, 2004). Following a brief explanation of the personal goal 
construct, participants were asked to brainstorm personal goals that they would 
usually or characteristically try to achieve over the next year. All responses were 
written down. Participants were prompted for further goals using common valued life 
domains (Rapp, 1998), following paradigms used in behavioural activation therapy 
(e.g. Hopko & Lejuez, 2008; Martell, Dimidjian, & Herman-Dunn, 2013), a well-
evidenced treatment for depression (Cuijpers et al., 2007). Emmons (2003) drew 
common themes from three separate lines of research (Ebersole, 1998; Emmons, 
1999; Wong, 1998) to propose four universal life striving domains: 
Work/achievement, Relationships/intimacy, Religion/spirituality and 
Generativity/service. The present study used a somewhat more detailed list of life 
domains, which has been published for use during goal setting for behavioural 
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activation (Hopko & Lejuez, 2008). This list can be seen to include the themes 
proposed by Emmons (2003). The domains were as follows: 
 1. Family relationships 
 2. Social relationships 
 3. Romantic relationships 
 4. Education, training, learning 
 5. Employment, career 
 6. Hobbies, recreation, leisure 
 7. Volunteer work, charity, political activities 
 8. Physical health  
 9. Spirituality 
 10. Mental health  
 
Further goals generated were written down. All goals were categorised according to 
the ten above content categories where possible, and those that did not fit any 
category were labelled ‘other’. Goals were categorised collaboratively with 
participants at the time of generation, and recorded under the appropriate sub-
heading in the goal assessment form, included in Appendix C. No time limit was 
enforced for the generation of goals, in order to facilitate participants to think 
inclusively about strivings for the next year. Participants were asked whether they 
would like to add any more goals, until they reported no more. Following this, 
participants were asked to pick their three most important goals from all those 
generated. The three selected goals were written out on flash cards to facilitate 
further discussion. Goal motivation and self-concordance were then assessed for 
each of these three in turn, as follows.  
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To assess goal motivation, participants were first asked to report all of the reasons 
for their pursuit of the selected goal. No time limit was enforced for the generation of 
reasons for goal pursuit, in order to facilitate participants to think inclusively about 
their motivations. These were written down, and later classified as approach or 
avoidance motivations, following the procedure used by Sherratt & MacLeod (2013). 
Any motivations not classifiable as approach or avoidance were labelled ‘other’. A 
second independent rater, a Clinical Psychology Doctoral trainee with a research 
doctoral qualification in psychology, re-rated a randomly-selected 20% of the goals’ 
motivations, 59 motivations in total. The two raters agreed on 52 of the 59 motivation 
ratings (88%), and inter-rater reliability was assessed using Cohen’s ĸ = .73, 
indicating substantial agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). All seven of the motivations 
upon which the two raters disagreed were rated as 'other' by one rater and as either 
approach or avoidance by the other. No motivations were rated as approach by one 
rater and avoidance by the other. 
 
Goal self-concordance was assessed following the method reported by Sheldon and 
colleagues (e.g. Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). For each goal, participants were asked to 
rate, on a scale of 0 (not at all for this reason) to 10 (completely for this reason), their 
agreement with the following statements.  
 
1. You pursue this goal because somebody else wants you to or because the 
situation demands it.  
2. You pursue this goal because you would feel ashamed, guilty or anxious if you 
didn’t.  
3. You pursue this goal because you really believe that it’s an important goal to have.  
4. You pursue this goal because of the fun and enjoyment that it provides you.  
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Goal self-concordance was calculated by subtracting the scores for the first two items 
(concerning external and introjected motivation) from the summed score of the third 
and fourth items (concerning identified and intrinsic motivation). Total self-
concordance for three goals can therefore range from -60 to +60, where -60 
corresponds to minimal self-concordance (maximum external and introjected 
motivation, zero intrinsic or identified motivation) and +60 corresponds to maximal 
self-concordance (maximum intrinsic and identified motivation, zero external or 
introjected motivation). Sheldon et al. (2004) found Cronbach’s alpha coefficients 
ranging between .70 and .80 for composite self-concordance across four participant 
samples from different cultures. 
 
2.4 Ethical approval and research sites 
An application was made through the Integrated Research Applications System for 
review of the project by an NHS Research Ethics Committee and by the R&D 
department of each of the four London NHS Trusts where recruitment would take 
place: the Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust, the East London NHS 
Foundation Trust, the Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust and the 
Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust. The Camden and Islington NHS 
Research Ethics Committee reviewed the study, and gave a favourable opinion of the 
project (ref. 14/LO/0549) on the 20th May, 2014. Approval was subsequently given 
by the Royal Holloway, University of London, Psychology Department Research 
Ethics Committee (ref. 2014/074) on the 4th July, 2014. The Berkshire Healthcare 
NHS Foundation Trust Research and Development Department gave approval for 
the study to go ahead on the 21st May, 2014 (ref. 2014/22). The North Thames 
Clinical Research Network granted R&D approval on behalf of the other three NHS 
Trusts on the 21st May 2014. Copies of the favourable opinion letters are included in 
Appendix A. 
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A local collaborator was established at each site. Consultant psychiatrists, 
psychologists and team leaders of relevant community care teams were contacted to 
request their approval for recruitment of patients in their care, and presentations were 
made at team meetings to explain the project and to encourage referrals by care co-
ordinators.  
 
2.5 Procedure 
All participants read the information sheet and had the opportunity to ask any 
questions before consenting to take part. All gave written informed consent to 
participate in the study. Each participant completed the study measures once, during 
one or more meetings, according to the participant's preference. Three participants 
chose to complete the measures in two meetings, and 27 participants completed all 
measures in one meeting.  
 
The clinical symptom measures were administered first, in order to establish a 
shared understanding of participants' current circumstances and difficulties before 
assessing goals. Participants completed the GPTS, BDI and BAI. Diagnoses and 
presence of persecutory delusions were confirmed using the semi-structured clinical 
interview Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN) version 2.1 
(World Health Organisation, 1998). The Psychotic SYmptoms RATing Scales 
(PSYRATS; Haddock et al., 1999) Delusions Scale was also used to assess the 
current multidimensional severity of delusions. Participants then completed the BCSS 
and PSWQ questionnaires and WTAR and VAS tests.  Goals and motivations were 
assessed last. Visual analogue scales of mood (anxiety, sadness and happiness) 
were completed before and after the procedure, so that a check could be made of 
any mood changes occurring over the course of the assessment. 
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Most of the assessments (N = 22) took place at the participants' clinical care team 
bases. Five participants were seen at home, because they had particularly strong 
fears about going outside and travelling by public transport. Home visits went ahead 
with the following safety procedures, consistent with the recruiting NHS Trusts' 
policies regarding home visits: visits were only made if the participants' clinical teams 
agreed that they would be happy for the experimenter to make a visit, and had no 
concerns about safety; teams were informed about the timing of planned visits; and 
the experimenter made telephone contact with the clinical teams before and after 
each visit, to ensure that safety was maintained. One participant, who was an 
inpatient at the time of testing, completed the study measures on the ward. One 
participant completed the measures at the hostel in which he was resident, and one 
further participant completed them in a quiet room in a cafe, where she requested to 
meet instead of either her home or the clinic. 
 
2.6 Analysis 
The total numbers of goals produced by participants in each content category were 
recorded, as well as the numbers of goals produced that did not fit into any of the ten 
categories. These counts were repeated, using only the three goals that each 
participant prioritised as most important for the next year. These figures were used to 
provide a descriptive profile of goal content.  
 
The numbers of approach motivations, avoidance motivations and ‘other’ motivations 
generated for each of the ‘top three’ goals were summed. Correlations were 
computed between BDI depression scores and the three goal-related indices: 
approach motivation, avoidance motivation and self-concordance. Associations of the 
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goal-related indices with paranoia, anxiety, schematic beliefs and worry were also 
examined.  
 
A follow-up question emerged following consultation with the clinical teams who 
cared for participants: how do goal motivations and self-concordance vary across 
goal content categories? This question was explored graphically. 
 
Changes in VAS mood ratings from the start to the end of the procedure were 
examined as an index of the acceptability of the assessment process. 
 
2.7 Summary 
The present investigation was designed to address two principal aims. The study set 
out, firstly, to descriptively examine the personal goals of a group of people with 
persecutory delusions, and, secondly, to analyse the associations between their goal 
motivations and symptoms, particularly levels of depression. Associations of 
motivational factors with worry and schematic beliefs were also of interest. The key 
motivational factors of interest were numbers of approach motivations, numbers of 
avoidance motivations and self-concordance of goals. The next chapter reports the 
results of the study. 
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Chapter 3. Results 
This chapter reports the results of the present investigation into the personal goals 
and motivations of people with persecutory delusions, and their associations with 
depression, other symptoms and associated cognitive factors. Data screening and 
participant characteristics are summarised first. A descriptive profile is then 
presented of the personal goals identified by participants, followed by the results of 
statistical analyses. Quantitative analyses tested the study hypotheses: that higher 
depression scores among the group would be associated with fewer approach 
motivations for goals, more avoidance motivations for goals and lower goal self-
concordance scores. Exploratory analyses examined associations of goal 
motivations and self-concordance with paranoia, anxiety, schematic beliefs and 
worry.  
 
3.1 Missing data 
There were high completion rates of the measures, with minimal missing data. One 
participant was unable to give a percentage rating of delusional distress for the 
PSYRATS. One participant omitted one item of the GPTS. One participant declined 
to answer item 21 of the BDI. One participant omitted one item of the BCSS. Data 
were complete for the BAI and PSWQ. In total, 0.09% of questionnaire data were 
missing. Each of the three omitted questionnaire items was replaced with the 
participant's mean score from the other items on the scale, or the subscale for the 
BCSS (Schafer & Graham, 2002). 
 
3.2 Normality of distributions and outliers in the data 
The distributions of scores for clinical symptom measures (PSYRATS, GPTS, BDI, 
BAI) and for the PSWQ and BCSS did not deviate significantly from normality. No 
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outliers were evident in these distributions, with the criterion used of outliers lying 
outside of three standard deviations either side of the mean score (Howell, 1998). 
Parametric tests were therefore used for statistical analyses carried out among these 
variables. Some deviations from normality were evident, however, in the data 
concerning goal motivations. Shapiro-Wilk tests indicated that the distributions of 
avoidance motivation and 'other' motivation numbers differed significantly from 
normality, both p <.01. The distribution of avoidance motivation numbers showed 
significant positive skew (skewness = 1.19, SE(skewness) = .43, z = 2.77). The 
distribution of 'other' motivation numbers also showed significant positive skew 
(skewness = 2.00, SE(skewness) = .43, z = 4.65). The distribution of approach 
motivation numbers showed a trend towards deviation from normality (skewness = 
.80, SE(skewness) = .43, z = 1.860, Shapiro-Wilk W(30) = .931, p = .05. Self-
concordance scores were relatively normally distributed. Spearman's rank order 
correlations were used in statistical analyses examining the associations of goal 
motivations with other variables, in view of deviations from normality evident in the 
score distributions (Field, 2009). 
 
One univariate outlier was identified in the distribution of avoidance motivation 
scores, using the definition of an outlier as scoring more than three standard 
deviations either side of the mean: this individual scored 8 on avoidance motivation, 
while three standard deviations greater than the mean would = 7.77. It was therefore 
decided to repeat the main study analyses with and without this outlier, to identify any 
differences. One univariate outlier was also identified in the distribution of 'other' 
motivation scores, who scored 6 while three standard deviations above the mean 
would = 5.09. This outlier was not relevant to the main study analyses, which did not 
involve the 'other' motivation variable. 
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3.3 Participant demographic and clinical characteristics 
3.3.1 Demographics 
The study participants comprised 15 males and 15 females with schizophrenia-
spectrum diagnoses and current persecutory delusions. Participants ranged in age 
from 19 to 66 years old, with a mean age of 35 years (SD = 12 years). A mixture of 
ethnicities was reported: 11 participants described their ethnicity as 'white', four as 
'black Caribbean', four as 'black African', two as 'black other', one as 'Pakistani', 
seven as 'other', and one person declined to classify their ethnicity. Marital status 
was 'single' for 26 participants, 'married' for one, 'divorced/separated' for two and 
'widowed' for one participant. One of the 30 participants reported co-habiting with a 
partner. Highest levels of educational attainment in the group varied considerably: 
one participant had a postgraduate diploma, six had a degree, five had a diploma or 
foundation degree, six had A/AS levels, seven had GCSEs, and five had none of the 
above, having not completed secondary school. Two participants were working full 
time, none worked part time, four had been unemployed for less than a year, 13 had 
been unemployed for more than a year, two were full time students, two were part 
time students, six were volunteers, and one was retired. English was a second 
language for eight of the participants, but all had a sufficient grasp of the language to 
complete the assessments. 
 
3.3.2 Clinical characteristics 
One participant was a psychiatric inpatient at the time of testing, although they had 
been recruited to the study via their usual outpatient clinical team. The others were 
outpatients. Recruitment targeted four NHS trusts in London, but all participants were 
successfully recruited from Barnet, Enfield & Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust. 15 
participants were recruited through an Early Intervention in Psychosis team, and 15 
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were recruited through Community Recovery teams. All but one of the participants 
were prescribed antipsychotic medication at the time of testing, although one of those 
prescribed this was thought to be non-compliant. Six of the participants were taking 
antidepressant medication alongside antipsychotics. Among the 30 participants with 
delusions, 15 had a case-note diagnosis of schizophrenia, one was diagnosed with 
delusional disorder, 12 were diagnosed with unspecified nonorganic psychosis, and 
two had uncertainty about which schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis was most 
appropriate. The Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN 
version 2.1; World Health Organisation, 1998) semi-structured clinical interview 
confirmed that all participants met the ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for a schizophrenia-
spectrum disorder. The assessment also indicated that 19 of the 30 participants 
(63%) met ICD-10 criteria for a diagnosis of a current major depressive episode 
occurring alongside psychosis. An independent-samples t-test indicated that BDI 
depression scores were significantly higher in the subgroup who met diagnostic 
criteria for current depression (M = 26.24, 95% CI [22.13, 30.35]) than in the 
subgroup who did not (M = 12.27, 95% CI [6.06, 18.48]), t(28) = -4.19, p < .01. 
 
3.4 Clinical and cognitive measures 
3.4.1 Delusion severity 
Table 1 presents the content of the main persecutory belief reported by each of the 
participants. PSYRATS total delusion severity scores for the main persecutory belief 
ranged from 5 to 23, with a mean score of 15.33 (SD = 3.93). 
 
 
 
 
 Page 65 
Participant 
number 
Persecutory belief 
P01 
The government are persecuting me and trying to silence me. Due to 
the awareness I have of government plans for the future, I live in fear 
of persecution from government agencies. 
P02 
Some people who have abused me in the past want to hurt me again 
(and want to kill me). 
P03 Terrorists will kill me. 
P04 The police are irritating me to get me a criminal record. 
P05 People are playing with my mind to upset me. 
P06 The neighbours are getting at me on purpose to bring me down. 
P07 
The people with any power are trying to take what's important to me 
out of me. 
P08 People are winding me up to upset me. 
P09 People are hurting me on purpose to bring me down. 
P10 The neighbours are winding me up on purpose to upset me. 
P11 People are upsetting me by talking about me behind my back. 
P12 People are monitoring my thoughts and persecuting me. 
P13 People are trying to upset me on purpose. 
P14 
People have been persecuting me with witchcraft, and it is still going 
on. 
P15 The voices are trying to kill me. 
P16 People will attack me in the street. 
P17 People are persecuting me and trying to kill me. 
P18 Someone will break into my house and hurt me. 
P19 My family are bringing me down on purpose. 
P20 My ex-partner is bringing me down on purpose. 
P21 
E would bring me down and damage my reputation further if she 
could. 
P22 Someone will break into the house and hurt me. 
P23 People are controlling my thoughts to confuse me and upset me. 
P24 People have sent spirits to harm me, degrade me and defame me. 
P25 People are interfering with my activities because of jealousy. 
P26 I am being controlled and put to pain. 
P27 People are persecuting me, directly and indirectly. 
P28 People will control me to bring me down. 
P29 People are trying to make me suffer, and they want to kill me. 
P31 The police are persecuting me with voices. 
Table 1. The main persecutory belief reported by each participant. 
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Figure 1 summarises the multidimensional severity of delusions reported by 
participants, as measured by PSYRATS items, with specific reference to the main 
persecutory belief of each individual. Conviction percentage ratings for delusions 
ranged from 20% to 100%, with a mean of 77% and a standard deviation of 25%. 
Distress percentage ratings ranged from 0% to 100%, with a mean of 63% and a 
standard deviation of 26%. PSYRATS total scores were significantly correlated with 
GPTS scores, r(28) = .68, p < .01, indicating a significant association of large effect 
size (Cohen, 1992) between the severity of participants' main persecutory delusions 
and the intensity of their self-reported paranoia overall. 
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Figure 1. The multidimensional severity of persecutory delusions in the sample. 
 
3.4.2 Clinical and cognitive questionnaire measures 
Descriptive statistics for the participants' clinical and cognitive questionnaire scores 
are summarised in Table 2 below. These scores are similar to those found in 
previous studies of this population (e.g. Vorontsova et al., 2013). Table 3 
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summarises the numbers of participants who fell within each clinical cut-off category 
according to BDI and BAI scores. 
 
 
GPTS  
Paranoia 
BDI 
Depression 
BAI 
Anxiety 
PSWQ 
Worry 
Highest 171 43 57 76 
Mean (SD) 102.06 (39.00) 21.02 (11.02) 22.23 (12.97) 53.77 (11.73) 
Lowest 32 3 0 34 
Brief Core Schema Scale subscale scores 
 Negative Self Positive Self Negative Other Positive Other 
Highest 21 23 24 24 
Mean (SD) 6.03 (5.30) 12.03 (6.53) 11.83 (6.92) 9.53 (7.50) 
Lowest 0 0 0 0 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of participants' clinical and cognitive questionnaire 
scores. 
  
 Minimal Mild Moderate Severe 
BDI 8 (27%) 5 (17%) 10 (33%) 7 (23%) 
BAI 5 (17%) 4 (13%) 10 (33%) 11 (37%) 
Table 3. Numbers and percentages of participants who scored in each clinical cut-off 
category according to the BDI and BAI. 
 
3.4.3 Premorbid IQ and verbal fluency 
The WTAR and FAS tests were used as broad indices of participants' premorbid IQ 
scores and current verbal fluency (an index of executive functioning), respectively, to 
help characterise the sample relative to other studies of the same population. The 
group's mean number of correct words generated for the FAS test was 32.70 (SD = 
13.18). The group's mean standardised WTAR score was 88.13 (SD = 19.66). This is 
in line with previous reports from studies of similar groups (Freeman et al., 2010; 
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Startup et al., 2007). Scores are likely to have been lowered to some extent by the 
fact that eight of the 30 participants spoke English as a second language, so were 
less familiar with the irregular words contained in the WTAR than might have been 
expected of native speakers.  
 
3.5 Personal goals 
All participants were able to identify multiple personal goals for the next year when 
asked, and all identified additional goals when prompted using the ten life domain 
categories provided. The 30 participants identified 437 goals in total. The number of 
goals identified spontaneously before prompting ranged from one to 16, with a mean 
of 5.43 (SD = 2.73), and the number of goals identified in total ranged from five to 34, 
with a mean of 14.57 (SD = 6.55). The total number of goals produced by 
participants was not significantly correlated with FAS verbal fluency scores, r(28) = 
.33, p = .08. 
 
3.5.1 Descriptive overview of goals 
The content categories of participants' personal goals were examined to explore the 
phenomenological profile of strivings among a group of individuals with persecutory 
delusions.  Figure 2 summarises the numbers and percentages of personal goals 
identified in each category. The category of 'Education, learning and training' 
prompted the greatest number of goals, 56 (14%) in total. The category with least 
goals was 'Romantic relationships,' with only 22 goals (5%) in this category identified 
among the group of study participants. Each category thus contained goals 
comprising between 5% and 14% of total goals, which could be described as a 
relatively even spread.  
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Family, 52, 12%
Social, 35, 8%
Romantic, 22, 5%
Learning, 56, 14%
Working, 40, 9%
Leisure, 54, 12%
Charity, 24, 5%
Physical Health, 
44, 10%
Spirituality, 29, 7%
Mental Health, 54, 
12%
Other, 27, 6%
 
Figure 2. Numbers of goals identified in each category by the group as a whole. 
 
Each participant selected a 'top three' goals that might be most important over the 
forthcoming year. Figure 3 summarises the numbers and percentages of goals in 
each category that were selected by participants within their top three goals. The 
category 'Family relationships' contained the greatest number of 'top three' goals (15 
goals, 18%), and the category 'Romantic relationships' contained the fewest 'top 
three' goals (two goals, 2%).  
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Family, 15, 18%
Social, 6, 7%
Romantic, 2, 2%
Learning, 8, 9%
Working, 13, 14%
Leisure, 9, 10%
Charity, 3, 3%
Physical Health, 8, 
9%
Spirituality, 3, 3%
Mental Health, 10, 
11%
Other, 13, 14%
 
Figure 3. Numbers of 'top three' goals identified in each category by the group. 
 
Table 4 presents the goal selected as top priority by each participant, along with the 
content category of the goal. Thirteen of the participant group's 'top three' goals (14% 
of the total number of 'top three' goals)  fell into the 'other' category, rather than any 
of the prompt categories. These tended to relate to practical (e.g. "to find a new 
home") or financial concerns (e.g. "to pay off my bills"), although several were too 
abstract to classify (e.g. "living in the moment," "to find solutions to problems if there 
are any"). 
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Participant 
number 
Number One Goal Category 
P01 To complete my [college] course Learning 
P02 Living in the moment Other 
P03 To complete second year of [university] degree Learning 
P04 To get paid a salary Working 
P05 
To find a great job in which I will be happy, with 
good money 
Working 
P06 
To have a brain scan to prove that I'm wearing fibre 
on my head and I can speak more of myself. 
Physical Health 
P07 
To find a more amiable relationship with my patterns 
of thought 
Mental Health 
P08 To try to be a bit happier Mental Health 
P09 To go to university to study health and social care. Learning 
P10 To do more exercise Physical Health 
P11 To have my daughter with me Family 
P12 
To overcome my severe OCD condition - try to be 
normal again. 
Mental Health 
P13 To take medication properly Mental Health 
P14 To travel Leisure 
P15 To get off the drink and stop smoking Physical Health 
P16 To increase wellbeing and freedom Mental Health 
P17 I want my daughter to get a husband Family 
P18 To get a job that I enjoy and can use graphics skills Working 
P19 To find a new home Other 
P20 To get my child back Family 
P21 To lose some weight Physical Health 
P22 To do some training to help get back to work Learning 
P23 To start doing some charity work Charity 
P24 To go to Mecca in March Spirituality 
P25 To get back into full time employment Working 
P26 To improve my health - physical and mental Physical Health 
P27 
To continue to impress the gods and goddesses of 
my ancestors - the 'ultimate awesome team' 
Spirituality 
P28 To keep on going to church Spirituality 
P29 To get a job Working 
P31 To nurse mother back to health Family 
Table 4. The top prioritised goal for the next year identified by each participant. 
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3.5.2 Goal motivations: approach, avoidance and self-
concordance 
Descriptive statistics of the numbers of approach, avoidance and 'other' motivations 
that participants gave for their top three goals and the self-concordance scores for 
these same goals are presented in Table 5 below. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
indicated a significant difference between the numbers of approach motivations (M = 
6.30, SD = 3.17) and avoidance motivations (M = 2.37, SD = 1.83) generated for 
participants' top three goals, p < .01, with more approach than avoidance motivations 
given. 
 
 Approach Avoidance Other Self-concordance 
Scores for number one goal 
Highest 8 3 2 20 
Mean (SD) 2.07 (1.91) 0.93 (0.87) 0.37 (0.67) 8.20 (8.05) 
Lowest 0 0 0 -9 
Total scores for top three goals 
Highest 14 8 6 60 
Mean (SD) 6.30 (3.17) 2.37 (1.83) 1.07 (1.34) 25.23 (20.62) 
Lowest 1 0 0 -9 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for numbers of goal motivations by subtype and self-
concordance scores relating to participants' top three goals. 
 
3.6 Hypothesis testing: correlations of depression scores 
with goal motivations and self-concordance 
Spearman's one-tailed non-parametric rank-order correlations were used, in view of 
some deviations from normality in data distributions, to test the main study 
hypotheses by examining associations of BDI depression scores with goal 
motivations and self-concordance. Self-concordance being a compound variable 
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calculated from four independently rated items, correlations of BDI depression scores 
with each of the four individual items were also examined. The resulting correlation 
coefficients are summarised in Table 6 below.  
 
Correlation with BDI Approach Avoidance Other Self-concordance 
rs -.22 .36* .20 -.37* 
p .13 .02 .15 .02 
 Individual self-concordance items  
Correlation with BDI External Introjected Identified Intrinsic 
rs .27 .40* .15 .04 
p .08 .02 .21 .43 
Table 6. Correlations of depression scores with goal motivations and self-
concordance, with associated significance values. * denotes significance at α < .05 
level. 
 
The results showed a significant positive correlation between depression scores and 
avoidance motivations, and a significant negative correlation between depression 
scores and goal self-concordance. Both of these correlations were of medium effect 
size (Cohen, 1992). Two of the three study hypotheses were thus supported: an 
association of higher depression with more avoidance motivation, and an association 
of higher depression with lower goal self-concordance. When correlations of BDI 
depression scores with individual items of the self-concordance measure were 
examined, the only significant association found was of higher depression scores 
with higher scores on the introjected motivation item ('You pursue this goal because 
you would feel ashamed, guilty or anxious if you didn’t.') A non-significant trend was 
evident between higher depression scores and higher scores on the external 
motivation item ('You pursue this goal because somebody else wants you to or 
because the situation demands it.')  
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The third study hypothesis, regarding a negative association between depression 
and approach motivations, was not supported by the present findings, despite a trend 
in the predicted direction. 
 
 Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the significant correlations found, using scatter graphs of 
BDI depression scores plotted against numbers of avoidance motivations and against 
goal self-concordance scores, respectively. The one outlier identified in the 
distribution of avoidance motivations is labelled P15. 
 
 
Figure 4. Scatter plot of participants' BDI scores and avoidance motivations. 
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Figure 5. Scatter plot of participants' BDI scores and total goal self-concordance. 
 
The analyses to test the main study hypotheses were repeated with one outlier 
excluded, who had an unusually high avoidance motivation score. The pattern of 
significant results was the same, with significant correlations evident of depression 
with avoidance motivation scores, sr = .35, p = .03, and of depression with self-
concordance scores, sr = -.36, p = .03. The analyses with or without the outlier thus 
supported the same two of the three study hypotheses. 
 
3.7  Additional exploratory analyses  
Associations of goal motivation scores and self-concordance with anxiety, paranoia, 
worry, schematic belief scores and verbal fluency were also examined. Spearman's 
two-tailed non-parametric rank-order correlations were used, due to the absence of 
directional hypotheses, and in view of deviations from normality in data distributions. 
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In view of the exploratory nature of these analyses, the Bonferroni correction was not 
employed. Correlation coefficients and associated significance values are 
summarised in Table 7.  
 Approach Avoidance 
Self-
concordance 
BAI sr -.35 .14 -.10 
p .06 .47 .60 
GPTS sr -.29 .38* .05 
p .13 .04 .79 
PSWR sr -.19 .18 -.21 
p .32 .34 .26 
BCSS SN sr -.10 .17 -.24 
p .59 .38 .21 
BCSS SP sr .11 .01 .33 
p .57 .98 .08 
BCSS ON sr -.16 .27 .02 
p .40 .16 .92 
BCSS OP sr .07 .29 .07 
p .72 .12 .73 
FAS sr .38* -.01 -.07 
p .04 .96 .70 
 
Table 7. Correlation coefficients and associated significance values for associations 
of goal motivation and self-concordance scores with clinical and cognitive measures. 
* denotes significance at the α < .05 level. 
 
Avoidance motivations showed a significant positive correlation with GPTS paranoia 
scores, sr (28) = .38, p = .04, indicating an association between higher paranoia and 
more avoidance motivations. The correlation between avoidance motivations and 
GPTS paranoia scores did not remain significant when BDI depression scores were 
statistically covaried, r(27) = .28, p = .14. 
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Approach motivations showed a significant positive correlation with FAS verbal 
fluency scores, sr (28) = .38, p = .04, indicating an association between higher verbal 
fluency and more approach motivations. Approach motivations and goal self-
concordance showed no statistically significant correlations with paranoia, anxiety, 
worry or BCSS schematic belief scores, although the correlation between BAI anxiety 
scores and approach motivations showed a negative trend approaching significance, 
sr = -.35, p = .06. There was therefore a tendency towards higher BAI anxiety scores 
being associated with fewer approach motivations for goals. 
 
3.8 Goal motivations and self-concordance by category 
Discussion of the key study findings, as presented in this chapter thus far, with the 
team of psychologists who worked with, and helped to recruit, the study participants, 
led to identification of a further question of interest to these key stakeholders: how do 
approach and avoidance motivation numbers and self-concordance scores vary 
across the categories of goals by content? This question was explored by calculating 
descriptive statistics for the numbers of approach and avoidance motivations and 
self-concordance scores for each category of goals by content. Figures 6 and 7 
summarise these statistics for approach/avoidance motivations and self-
concordance, respectively.  
 
The three goal categories of 'Physical health,' 'Mental health' and 'other' (goals 
categorised as 'other' were mostly practical or financial in content, or were too 
abstract to classify) contained goals with the highest numbers of avoidance 
motivations and the lowest self-concordance scores, on average, among the goal 
content categories. These three goal categories also had some of the lowest average 
numbers of approach motivations identified, alongside the category of 'Spirituality.'  
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Figure 6. Mean (SD) approach and avoidance motivations identified per goal, 
classified by goal content category. 
 
Figure 7. Mean (SD) goal self-concordance scores per goal, classified by goal 
content category. 
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The lowest average numbers of avoidance motivations were identified for goals in the 
categories of 'Spirituality,' 'Volunteering,' 'Romantic relationships,' 'Learning' and 
'Leisure.' The categories 'Volunteering,' 'Romantic relationships,' 'Learning' and 
'Leisure' also had some of the highest average numbers of approach motivations 
identified, alongside the category of 'Employment.' The categories of 'Leisure,' 
'Spirituality,' 'Social relationships,' 'Romantic relationships' and 'Learning' contained 
goals with the highest average self-concordance ratings given. 
 
The categories of 'Spirituality,' 'Volunteering' and 'Romantic relationships' only 
contained two or three goals each, whereas all other categories contained at least six 
goals. Particular caution was therefore appropriate in interpreting the patterns of goal 
motivations and self-concordance scores for these minority goal categories.  
 
3.9 Acceptability of the study procedures: visual analogue 
scale mood ratings and feedback 
Participants' visual analogue scale (VAS) mood ratings at the beginning and end of 
the study procedure were examined as indices of any changes in mood that might 
have occurred over the course of the assessment process. Participants were also 
asked directly about their experience of study participation. Figure 8 presents the 
means and 95% confidence intervals of the group's ratings of anxiety, sadness and 
happiness at the two time points.  
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Figure 8. Participants' mean mood ratings at the beginning and end of the 
assessment procedure. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
A multivariate repeated measures analysis of variance (MANOVA), with time as a 
within-subjects factor and anxiety, sadness and happiness as dependant variables, 
was used to identify any statistically significant changes over time in participants' 
scores on the three VAS scales. The MANOVA was used because this test controls 
the familywise Type I error rate in testing for multivariate change in a set of variables 
first, and if this is significant, then univariate follow-up ANOVA results can be 
examined for significant changes in individual variables (Field, 2009). The MANOVA 
results indicated, using Pillai's trace, a significant multivariate effect of time on the 
dependant mood variables, V = 0.14, F(3,56) = 3.15, p = .03. Follow-up univariate 
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ANOVAS revealed a significant effect of time on sadness, F(1,58) = 6.13, p = .02. 
Inspection of the descriptive statistics indicated that sadness ratings were lower at 
the end of the assessment (M = 27.70, SD = 25.39) than at the beginning of the 
assessment (M = 45.27, SD = 29.42). The effect of time on happiness ratings 
approached significance, F(1,58) = 3.90, p = .05 (slightly higher than the criterion 
value of .05). Inspection of the descriptive statistics indicated that happiness ratings 
appeared to be higher at the end of the assessment (M = 59.80, SD = 21.18) than at 
the beginning of the assessment (M = 48.83, SD = 21.82). There was no significant 
effect of time on anxiety ratings, F(1,58) = 0.12, p = .73. In summary, participants 
reported feeling significantly less sad at the end of the procedure than at the 
beginning, and there was a nearly significant trend for participants to report feeling 
happier at the end of the procedure than at the beginning. There was no indication of 
any significant change in anxiety ratings from the beginning to the end of the 
assessment. 
 
The positive pattern in visual analogue scale mood rating changes was consistent 
with participants' qualitative feedback about participation in the study, which also 
indicated that the procedure was acceptable to those who took part. The only 
negative feedback given, by one participant, was that the overall assessment 
process took quite a long time. A selection of quotations is presented below of 
participants' feedback regarding the experience of study participation. 
 
"It's been very beneficial - it's good to talk about things, and for somebody to take an 
account." 
"It was interesting to see what kind of questions you ask, and what you would ask 
further to what I give you, to see how you understand my mental health, if you know 
what I mean. It was an assessment for myself as well, of how I feel." 
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"It was alright, I was expecting some more harder questions." 
"It's alright - it's kinda like recuperating the brain!" 
"It's been fun. I have problems, actually, with filling in these forms, because there's a 
lot of questions, questions, questions... but at least I'm not answering 'oh I'm sad, 
and this and this.' It took a long time. [laughs]" 
"I hadn't thought about my goals and motivations in quite that format before - I had 
thought about my goals and motivations, but I hadn't broken them down by section 
like that, and I hadn't isolated which three were the most important, so that was quite 
interesting." 
 
3.10 Summary 
The goal assessment procedure was acceptable and feasible for all participants, and 
all were able to identify personal goals and to report their motivations. Two of the 
three study hypotheses were supported. The results indicated a significant 
association between higher depression scores and more avoidance motivations for 
personal goals, and a significant association between higher depression scores and 
lower self-concordance of personal goals. Both of these associations were of 
medium effect size, and were evident irrespective of whether or not an outlier was 
excluded from the analyses. No support was found for a hypothesised association 
between higher depression scores and fewer approach motivations for personal 
goals. Exploratory follow-up analyses indicated a significant association between 
higher paranoia scores and more avoidance motivations for personal goals. These 
exploratory findings did not relate to any a priori hypotheses, however, and cannot 
therefore be taken to indicate a population effect, beyond the characteristics of the 
present study sample.  
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Chapter 4. Discussion 
Goal-directed thinking and motivational processes have been proposed to play an 
active role in the maintenance of depression over time, and evidence is accumulating 
in support of this proposal. An increasing understanding of the kinds of goals and 
motivations whose pursuit may drive most gains in wellbeing and achievement has 
driven therapeutic developments. The effectiveness of talking therapies can be 
facilitated by harnessing individuals' internal motivations and supporting them to 
engage in forms of goal pursuit that increase experiences of reward. The present 
study sought to take the first steps in extending an understanding of the clinical 
significance of personal goals and motivations to people with psychosis, specifically 
with delusions of persecution.  
 
This chapter presents an overview of the descriptive profile of personal goals 
identified by the study participants, and quantitative associations of aspects of goal 
motivation with depression are discussed in the context of the existing literature.  
Motivational aspects of personal goals were considered as potential mediators or 
mechanisms underlying the effect of depression on delusion persistence over time, 
as found in previous studies of this population. Associations of depression scores 
with goal motivations and self-concordance were examined, in line with previous 
studies of groups without psychosis. The acceptability of the assessment procedure 
used in the study was considered, as indexed by mood ratings before and after 
testing, as well as qualitative feedback from participants. Limitations, clinical 
implications and directions for further research are also addressed. 
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4.1 Personal goals identified by the group 
All participants were able to identify personal goals for the next year and motivations 
for these, as well as rating self-concordance. No substantial difficulties in goal 
assessment were thus evident with this group, which supports the feasibility and 
acceptability of the procedure. Given that this is the first study to have used this form 
of goal assessment with a group of people who have persecutory delusions, the 
feasibility and acceptability of the assessment process for this population was of 
interest in and of itself. Further indices of the acceptability of the procedure will be 
discussed later in this chapter, after the main findings have been considered. 
 
4.1.1 Descriptive profile of goals 
Goals identified by participants were distributed fairly evenly across the eleven 
categories (including 'other') into which they were classified, with each category 
comprising between 5% and 14% of total goals identified. Most of the goals identified 
by participants (410/437 goals, 94%) fell into one of the ten content categories used 
for prompting, which supports the fit of the category set to the strivings of the 
individuals who took part. The group of individuals with persecutory delusions who 
took part in the present study were thus able to classify most of their goals for the 
next year into a set of categories derived from studies of the general population and 
individuals experiencing depression (Emmons, 2003; Hopko & Lejuez, 2008; Martell 
et al., 2013). This suggests that similar life domain goal content category prompts are 
applicable to these groups. Goals falling in the 'other' category tended to relate to 
practical or financial concerns, which were not included in the life domains prompt list 
used in this study and in behavioural activation therapy (Hopko & Lejuez, 2008; 
Martell et al., 2013). Practical and financial strivings were also absent from Emmons' 
(2003) set of universal life domains, and may reflect more situation-bound desires to 
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solve circumstantial problems, rather than perpetual internally-driven valued life 
directions. One of the two qualitative studies of the goals of people with delusions 
mentioned in section 1.9 (Rhodes & Jakes, 2000) included the category of 'Material 
base' as one of six into which participants' goals could be classified, and this 
corresponded to practical and financial concerns. It is possible that individuals 
experiencing delusions, including those taking part in Rhodes and Jakes (2000) and 
in the present study, are more likely to report practical and/or financial goals than 
samples from the general population, in line with the known higher prevalence of 
poverty and social deprivation experienced by groups of people with psychosis 
compared to those without (e.g. Kirkbride, Jones, Ullrich, & Coid, 2014; Murali & 
Oyebode, 2004). Direct comparisons between groups were not possible within the 
context of the single-group design of the present study. 
 
Among the categories of goal content, the highest number of goals was generated in 
the category of 'Education, learning and training,' and the lowest number of goals 
was generated in the category of 'Romantic relationships.'  When participants 
selected their top three most important goals for the next year, the category of 
'Family relationships' contained the highest number of goals selected, and the 
category of 'Romantic relationships' contained the lowest. It thus appeared that 
participants in this study consistently placed romantic relationships relatively low 
down in their priorities for personal strivings in the forthcoming year, whereas family 
matters and the development of new skills and/or knowledge were prioritised 
relatively highly.  
 
The assessment procedure was designed to support participants to think inclusively 
about goals in multiple areas of their lives, and the study did not aim to draw any 
conclusions about the relative prevalence of goals in particular life areas. It is 
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nevertheless of interest to consider that a broad range of goals were identified in 
many life domains, and that the domains to which goals most frequently belonged 
were of the sort relevant to most people, such as family relationships and the 
development of knowledge and/or skills. Mental health-related goals did not dominate 
the profile of personal strivings identified by the group, although goals in this category 
were also relatively prevalent, comprising 12% of goals in total and 11% of 'top three' 
goals.  
 
Exploratory follow-up examination of approach motivations, avoidance motivations 
and self-concordance scores for goals in different content categories indicated that 
goals in the physical health and mental health categories scored the most avoidance 
motivations (alongside 'other' goals, which were mostly practical or financial in 
content, or too abstract to categorise) and the lowest self-concordance scores, on 
average, among the goal categories. These categories also yielded some of the 
lowest average numbers of approach motivations, alongside the category relating to 
spirituality. Goals in these categories were therefore associated with the most 
'negative' motivational profiles (few approach motivations, many avoidance 
motivations, low self-concordance), corresponding to hypothesised associations with 
higher levels of depression. It is understandable that experiencing distressing 
difficulties with mental and/or physical ill health may drive individuals to prioritise 
addressing these issues, with underlying motivations of avoiding suffering. There is a 
tentative implication, however, that pursuit of these types of health-related or 
symptom-reduction goals, when motivated by avoidance and by external and/or 
introjected motivations, may tend not to bring individuals as much gain in wellbeing or 
achievement as pursuit of goals that are motivated more by approach and less by 
avoidance, and are driven by more intrinsic and identified motivations, rather than by 
external and/or introjected ones.  
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The goal content categories with the most 'positive' motivational characteristics (few 
avoidance motivations, many approach motivations, high self-concordance), included   
‘Leisure/hobbies/recreation’, ‘Education/training/learning’, ‘Romantic relationships’, 
‘Spirituality/religion’ and ‘Voluntary/charity/political activities’. The latter three 
categories only comprised two or three goals each (all other categories comprised at 
least six goals), which indicates particular caution in interpreting their patterns of 
motivation and self-concordance. The exploratory nature of this examination of the 
goals across content categories precludes any conclusions being drawn about the 
motivational tendencies of goals that fall in one category or another. A tentative 
summary might pick out, however, among the specified categories containing six or 
more goals, that the goal categories relating to physical and mental health showed 
the most 'negative' motivational profiles, while the categories relating to learning and 
to leisure activities showed the most 'positive' motivational profiles. Further research 
using larger samples to test a priori hypotheses will be necessary before any 
generalisations can be made beyond the present participant sample regarding the 
motivational characteristics of goals by content category. 
 
4.2 Hypothesis testing 
Two of the three study hypotheses were supported by the findings. Support was 
found for an association between higher depression scores and more avoidance 
motivations for personal goals, and for an association between higher depression 
scores and lower goal self-concordance. A hypothesised association between higher 
depression scores and fewer approach motivations for personal goals was not 
supported by the study findings. 
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4.2.1 Avoidance motivations for personal goals 
The study results supported the hypothesis that those with higher depression scores 
would report more avoidance goal motivations. The positive finding of an association 
between depression and avoidance motivations for personal goals mirrors reports 
from studies of people with major depressive disorder and non-clinical controls 
(Coats et al., 1996; Dickson & MacLeod, 2006; Sherratt & MacLeod, 2013; Vergara & 
Roberts, 2011), suggesting that the same effect may be evident for people with 
persecutory delusions and schizophrenia-spectrum diagnoses as has been shown in 
groups without psychosis.  
 
An association of higher depression scores with more avoidant motivations for goals 
is consistent with theoretical assertions, including those founded in control theories of 
self-regulation, that pursuit of goals driven by avoidance brings about negative 
affective and functional consequences (e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1990; Elliot, 2006), an 
effect which may be mediated by depletion of self-regulatory resources (Oertig et al., 
2013). The present findings would not, however, contradict an opposite hypothesis: 
that avoidant motivation might occur in response to depression. The cross-sectional 
nature of this study precludes any conclusive evidence being produced for either 
direction of causality. The association may in fact be bidirectional: avoidant goal 
striving may increase feelings of depression, which might feed back to further 
increase avoidance in goal striving, which may further increase depression. It is also 
possible that other factors, such as the occurrence of traumatic experiences, might 
cause both depression and a motivational focus on avoidance of possible further 
negative experiences. Traumatic experiences are known to be very common in the 
histories of people experiencing psychosis, and are associated both with positive 
psychotic symptoms and with depression in this group (e.g. Duhig et al., 2015; 
Varese et al., 2012).  
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Coats and colleagues' (1996) experimental findings, that manipulation of individuals' 
goals towards approach rather than avoidance resulted in more positive and less 
negative self-evaluations following completion of a task, supports a proposed causal 
role for goal orientation in shaping subsequent experience. Coats and colleagues 
manipulated the verbal framing of goals for participants, rather than targeting 
underlying motivations directly. For example, participants were instructed either to 
"be creative" or to "avoid being uncreative." The investigators did not assess 
underlying motivation, and conclusions cannot be drawn about causal effects of 
underlying motivations from the findings of this study. Coats and colleagues' 
experimental results do suggest, encouragingly, that therapeutic manipulation of 
approach vs. avoidance-orientated goal pursuit may be possible, and may have 
positive effects. Further exploration of such possibilities will be important for 
improving our understanding and application of goal motivation as a possible 
therapeutic target. 
 
It is possible that pursuit of goals driven by avoidant motivations may contribute to 
maintaining distressing persecutory beliefs in the same way that it has been 
proposed to maintain depression. The significant association found in the present 
study between higher paranoia scores and more avoidant motivations is consistent 
with such a proposal, although only correlational and exploratory in this case. The 
association between paranoia and avoidant motivations did not remain statistically 
significant when depression scores were partialled out, which suggests that the 
covariance between the two may have been accounted for, in part, by an association 
of both with depression. An individual pursuing a goal driven by avoidant motivations 
may focus on the negative content of the consequence that they are trying to avoid, 
and thus both perpetuate negative affect in response to the feared negative outcome 
and also fail to attend to the balance of information available in their environment. 
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This focus on feared negative outcomes may contribute to the selective information 
processing that perpetuates delusions (Freeman et al., 2002), directing attention 
towards possible negative interpretations of events and away from possible positive 
interpretations, and reducing the probability that distressing beliefs may be re-
evaluated. Resource depletion brought about through avoidant goal striving (Oertig et 
al., 2013) could further decrease an individual's capacity to take on contradictory 
information and restructure beliefs. A profile of avoidant goal motivations - acting to 
avoid feared negative consequences - would be consistent with existing evidence 
that people holding persecutory delusions show an attentional bias towards potential 
threat (Bentall & Kaney, 1989). An avoidant motivational style in goal-directed 
thinking and behaviour might further explain the prevalence of safety behaviours in 
this group (Freeman et al., 2007), which are by definition motivationally-avoidant acts 
intended to avert feared harm. The use of safety behaviours can prevent delusional 
belief disconfirmation, as the non-occurrence of feared harm is explained by the 
individual's preventative actions (Freeman et al., 2007, 2002). The effects of an 
avoidant motivational style on information processing in perpetuating delusions may 
be further strengthened when combined with cognitive factors such as jumping to 
conclusions and belief inflexibility, as conceptualised in Freeman and colleagues' 
multifactorial model (Freeman et al., 2002). These cognitive biases are proposed to 
decrease the probability of individuals considering alternative explanations for 
experience, and may thus strengthen the effects of information processing biases by 
restricting the scope of one's explanatory framework to the one compelling and 
distressing explanation that threat-focused biases support. Further research into the 
associations of avoidant motivations and goal pursuit with ongoing symptom changes 
in people with distressing persecutory beliefs is warranted, particularly in relation to 
how avoidance motivations might longitudinally predict safety behaviours and the 
persistence of delusions over time.  
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4.2.2 Negative findings regarding approach motivations 
The hypothesis that higher depression scores would be associated with fewer 
approach motivations was not supported by the present study findings. It may be that 
no such effect exists in the population of people with persecutory delusions.  A 
number of other factors should be considered when interpreting this negative result. 
The present study comprised a relatively low number of participants, in line with its 
novelty, and was therefore only powered to detect relatively large effect sizes. The 
correlation coefficient between depression scores and approach motivations was of 
small effect size, in the expected direction (rs = -.22, p = .12), suggesting that a 
significant association may have been found if a greater number of participants from 
the same population had been tested. Sherratt and MacLeod (2013) reported an 
effect size of d = 0.67 for the difference between numbers of approach motivations 
for approach goals produced by their depressed and non-clinical groups. This 
corresponds to a medium effect size (Cohen, 1992), whereas the effect size reported 
for the difference between numbers of avoidance motivations given by the groups for 
approach goals was large, d = 1.02. It is possible that an association of smaller effect 
size exists between depression levels and approach motivations in the population of 
people with persecutory delusions, which the present study was not powered to 
detect.  
 
Differences in measures used to assess depression may have contributed to 
differences between study findings. Sherratt and MacLeod (2013) used the PHQ-9 
(Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001) to measure depression, whereas the present 
study used the BDI (BDI-II A. T. Beck et al., 1996). Both instruments assess 
depressive symptoms over the past two weeks. The BDI is longer, with 21 items, 
including those closely corresponding to the nine items of the PHQ-9. Additional 
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items of the BDI concern experiences, not covered by the PHQ-9, of guilt, 
punishment feelings, self-criticism, crying, indecisiveness, worthlessness, irritability, 
tiredness and loss of interest in sex. Both scales have demonstrated good, and 
mutually comparable, psychometric properties in studies of groups with major 
depressive disorder (e.g. Titov et al., 2011). The BDI was chosen for this study 
because it is known to have been used in previous studies of people experiencing 
persecutory delusions (e.g. Vorontsova et al., 2013). No systematic differences are 
known between the PHQ-9 and BDI in measuring depression in the present 
population, but it remains possible that the difference in measures may have 
contributed to the discrepancy between our findings and those of Sherratt and 
MacLeod (2013). 
 
People experiencing psychosis may report fewer motivations overall than groups 
without psychosis. The present study design did not include any comparison groups, 
and therefore could not address this question directly. The mean number of approach 
motivations given by the present group for three goals was 6.30 (SD = 3.17), and the 
mean number of avoidance motivations was 2.37 (SD = 1.83). The mean number of 
approach motivations per goal was therefore 2.10, and the mean number of 
avoidance motivations per goal was 0.79. Sherratt and MacLeod (2013) reported that 
their depressed group gave a mean number of 6.12 (SD = 4.47) approach 
motivations for two approach goals, and their non-clinical group gave a mean number 
of 8.24 (SD = 3.67) of the same. The figures for avoidance motivations for approach 
goals were mean = 4.00 (SD = 4.05) for the depressed group and mean = 1.06 (SD = 
1.50) for the non-clinical group. The mean number of approach motivations given per 
approach goal by the depressed group was therefore 3.06, and 4.12 for the controls. 
The mean number of avoidance motivations given per approach goal was 2.00 for 
the depressed group and 0.53 for the controls. The present study participants' mean 
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number of avoidance motivations per goal therefore fell intermediately between the 
corresponding figures for Sherratt and Macleod's (2013) depressed and non-
depressed groups. The present study participants' mean number of approach 
motivations, however, was considerably lower than the figures for both of Sherratt 
and MacLeod's (2013) groups. It is not clear from the present data what factors may 
have contributed to the present study participants producing fewer approach 
motivations overall than the participants of Sherratt and MacLeod's (2013) study. 
Relevant factors could include difficulties with concentration, negative symptoms 
and/or sedative effects of neuroleptic medication. It is likely that the restricted number 
of approach motivations produced a distribution with reduced variance compared to 
that of Sherratt and MacLeod's (2013) data, which may have lowered the detectable 
correlation with depression scores. The present study findings regarding a possible 
association of depression with approach motivations for personal goals in people with 
persecutory delusions remain inconclusive.  
 
4.2.3 Goals and motivation assessment procedures across 
studies 
Differences in the goal assessment procedures used in different studies are a key 
methodological issue to consider when interpreting the differing patterns of findings 
that have been reported by different studies in this area. Most of the earlier studies 
examining avoidance/approach goals (Dickson & MacLeod, 2004a, 2004b, 2006; 
Dickson et al., 2011; Vergara & Roberts, 2011) used the same protocol, wherein 
participants are asked to generate goals under two separate prompt conditions: 'it will 
be important for me to...' and 'it will be important for me to avoid...'. Goals produced 
under each condition are then counted as 'approach' or 'avoidance,' respectively, 
unless deemed to be completely inappropriate for the category. Coats and 
colleagues (1996) did not include two separate conditions in their study, but 
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encouraged participants to begin their goal statements with one of four phrases: 'It is 
important for me to...', 'It is important for me not to...', 'It is important for me to avoid...' 
or 'It is important for me to obtain...'. Sherratt and MacLeod (2103) argued that 
inconsistencies in these study findings may have been due to the fact that their goal 
assessment protocols did not access the underlying motivations behind participants' 
goals. They pointed out that goals framed as approach (e.g. "to get a job") may in 
fact belie avoidance motivations (e.g. "to stop my parents criticising me," "to stop 
having to rely on benefits"), and vice versa. The protocols used in previous studies 
(Coats et al., 1996; Dickson & MacLeod, 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Dickson et al., 2011; 
Vergara & Roberts, 2011) may thus have classified as 'approach' goals that had 
underlying avoidance motivations, and vice versa. Explicit demand of approach and 
avoidance statements in these protocols may have further influenced participants to 
frame goals motivated by avoidance as approach goals, or those motivated by 
approach as avoidance goals, and failed to reveal the underlying motivations. This 
may help to explain the negative findings of studies with clinical samples (Dickson et 
al., 2011; Vergara & Roberts, 2011) regarding an association between higher 
depression and fewer approach goals, as had been found in the non-clinical literature 
(Coats et al., 1996; Dickson & MacLeod, 2004a, 2004b, 2006): Sherratt and Macleod 
argued that assessment of underlying motivation may be necessary to examine 
approach-avoidance associations with depression scores in individuals with clinical 
depression. 
 
Sherratt and Macleod (2013) adapted Dickson and MacLeod's (2004) protocol, by 
using the same prompts for goal generation ('it will be important for me to...' and 'it 
will be important for me to avoid...'), then asking participants to identify two most 
important approach goals and two most important avoidance goals for the next year, 
and subsequently eliciting all the reasons (motivations) that participants could identify 
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for each of these four goals. Motivations were then coded as approach or avoidance. 
Sherratt and MacLeod found significant associations between depression and 
approach and avoidance underlying motivations for approach goals, but not for 
avoidance goals. It therefore appeared that the types of motivations underlying 
approach goals showed significant associations with depression, whereas goal 
statements generated for an explicit avoidance frame did not reveal a meaningful 
pattern of underlying motivations.  
 
The present study followed the procedure reported by Sherratt and MacLeod (2013), 
with some adaptations. The present procedure elicited goals using only an approach 
frame, following Sherratt and Macleod's finding that only this frame produced goals 
with a meaningful pattern of motivations associated with depression scores. The 
approach frame was chosen here to focus on material that might be most 
meaningful, and in avoidance of prolonging the assessment process unnecessarily. 
Another difference between the present study protocol and that used by Sherratt and 
MacLeod (2013) was that participants were prompted for goals in different life 
domains before being asked to select top priority goals. This step was included in the 
present protocol in order to support participants to think inclusively about different 
areas of their lives, and to derive a descriptive profile of their strivings.  The key 
result, in terms of approach and avoidance motivations underlying goals, was that the 
present study found the same association between avoidance motivations underlying 
approach-framed goals as was found by Sherratt and MacLeod (2013), with a slightly 
different assessment procedure and for the first time in a group with persecutory 
delusions. This finding lends support to the robustness of the proposed association of 
avoidance motivations with depression, which has now been demonstrated in a 
group of people with persecutory delusions experiencing varying levels of depressive 
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symptomatology, and is consistent with a role for avoidant goal striving in the 
perpetuation of depression over time (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Elliot, 2006).   
 
4.2.4 Depression and goal self-concordance 
The study findings supported the hypothesis that higher depression scores would be 
associated with lower goal self-concordance in the group. Self-concordance is 
conceptualised as the extent to which a goal is driven by autonomous or internally-
driven motivations, as opposed to controlled or externally-driven motivations (e.g. 
Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). The four questions used for participants to rate the self-
concordance of each of their three top-priority goals are reproduced below, for the 
reader’s convenience. Self-concordance scores are calculated by subtracting the 
scores given for the first and second statements below (each rated 0-10) from the 
summed score of the third and fourth statements. This represents subtracting 
external and introjected motivation scores from identified and intrinsic motivation 
scores, to form a composite index of self-concordance. 
 
1. You pursue this goal because somebody else wants you to or because the 
situation demands it.  
2. You pursue this goal because you would feel ashamed, guilty or anxious if you 
didn’t.  
3. You pursue this goal because you really believe that it’s an important goal to have.  
4. You pursue this goal because of the fun and enjoyment that it provides you.  
  
The findings of the present study are consistent with the findings of Ong and Phinney 
(2002) and Sherratt (2011), who studied groups of people without psychosis, but with 
varying levels of depression. The present results suggest that an association of high 
levels of depression with low self-concordance of personal goals, as previously found 
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in groups of people without psychosis, is also to be found in people with persecutory 
delusions and schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses. Such correlational findings cannot 
be taken as evidence of causality, in either direction. It is possible that low goal self-
concordance contributes to the increase or perpetuation of depression, via 
experiences of low wellbeing and limited achievement resulting from low self-
concordant goal striving, as proposed in a theoretical account (Sheldon & Elliot, 
1999). The converse is also possible: that the experience of depression might 
distance individuals from values-based or enjoyment-based goal striving, and draw 
them towards striving for goals driven by perceived external demands. Causal effects 
in both directions may operate simultaneously. Other factors may also influence both 
self-concordance of goals and depression. For example, cold parental care in early 
life has been proposed to contribute both to individuals' later goal motivations 
(Kasser, Ryan, Zax, & Sameroff, 1995) and to the development of depression 
(Parker, 1979; Shah & Waller, 2000). Sheldon and colleagues’ (2004; 1999) 
longitudinal findings, regarding the predictive effect of goal self-concordance on 
increases in wellbeing and achievement through goal pursuit over time, lend support 
to a causal role for higher goal self-concordance in contributing to better subsequent 
affective and functional outcomes.   
 
When individual motivational items of the self-concordance measure were examined, 
introjected motivation ('You pursue this goal because you would feel ashamed, guilty 
or anxious if you didn’t') showed a significant positive correlation with depression 
scores. External motivation ('You pursue this goal because somebody else wants 
you to or because the situation demands it') showed a non-significant positive trend 
towards association with depression scores. It is of note that high scores on these 
negative items of the self-concordance measure thus appeared to carry the 
association with depression, rather than low scores on the positive items regarding 
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identified and intrinsic motivation. This raises the possibility that the presence of 
introjected motivation for goals is particularly pathological, over and above the 
absence of intrinsic or identified motivation. A cognitive focus on the possible 
negative internal consequences of failure to pursue one’s goals (‘You pursue this 
goal because you would feel ashamed, guilty or anxious if you didn’t’) might trigger 
increases in negative affect, and thereby contribute to the exacerbation or 
maintenance of depression over time. It is also possible that the content of the 
introjected item (regarding feelings of shame, guilt or anxiety) is confounded with 
depressive symptoms, which may account for the high correlation between them. 
 
There was no indication in the present study findings of an association between goal 
self-concordance scores and paranoia or anxiety. It nevertheless remains possible 
that low self-concordance of personal goals may mediate, to some extent, the effect 
of depression on delusion persistence over time, although this would need to be 
established in future research. Several mechanisms for such an effect are feasible. A 
focus on perceived pressure from others (external motivation) may perpetuate 
external personal attributional bias for events, contributing to a tendency to interpret 
ambiguous difficult events as resulting from others’ intentional actions. A focus on 
possible negative internal consequences of failure to pursue goals (introjected 
motivation) may increase or maintain negative affect. Negative information 
processing biases associated with negative affect may then continue to increase the 
probability of threatening explanations being selected to interpret events. A cognitive 
focus on pleasurable aspects of goal striving (intrinsic motivation) may, on the other 
hand, trigger positive affect, and might thereby lessen the effect of negative 
information processing biases. A focus on the personal value or commitment to 
striving for particular goals (identified motivation) might bring to mind positively 
evaluated concepts (values), long-term outcomes (e.g. doing what’s important, acting 
 Page 99 
with integrity) and associated positive aspects of self-evaluation, which might lessen 
the influence of beliefs about personal vulnerability or powerlessness on delusion 
persistence. 
 
It is further possible that pursuit of goals that are motivated externally, as opposed to 
being driven by personal values and enjoyment, may impact the recovery of people 
with delusions via the functional effect of reducing goal achievement. Sheldon and 
colleagues' (2004; 1999) findings, that higher goal self-concordance scores 
prospectively predicted more success in goal attainment as well as gains in 
wellbeing, suggest the possibility that individuals striving for less self-concordant 
goals may experience poorer outcomes driven, in part, by reduced goal attainment.  
Further research, particularly using prospective longitudinal designs, will be 
necessary in order for any possible predictive effects of goal self-concordance on 
delusion persistence and goal achievement to be explored. 
 
4.3 Additional exploratory analyses 
A significant association between higher paranoia scores and more avoidance 
motivations for personal goals emerged from the exploratory correlational analyses. 
This finding has been discussed earlier in the chapter. A significant association 
between higher verbal fluency scores and more approach motivations for personal 
goals was also found. This suggests that a significant proportion of the variance in 
numbers of approach motivations generated by the participants in the present study 
could be accounted for by their levels of verbal fluency at the time of testing, rather 
than by clinical factors such as depression. There was no indication of any 
association of verbal fluency with avoidance motivations or self-concordance scores, 
which were the two motivational factors showing associations with depression, and 
no significant correlation was found between verbal fluency and numbers of goals 
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generated. These findings are interpreted with caution, in view of the exploratory 
nature of the analyses conducted, and may not generalise beyond the present study 
sample. The pattern of results tentatively suggests that, in this group, generation of 
more approach motivations for goals may be particularly associated with higher 
verbal fluency, whereas more avoidance motivations and lower goal self-
concordance are associated with higher levels of depression. The present pattern of 
findings did not suggest a consistent effect of verbal fluency on numbers of goals and 
motivations generated.  
 
The exploratory analyses indicated a non-significant trend towards an association 
between higher anxiety scores and fewer approach motivations for personal goals, 
and a non-significant trend towards an association between BCSS positive self 
beliefs and goal self-concordance scores. These trends are broadly consistent with 
the overall pattern in the literature, that lower numbers of approach motivations tend 
to be associated with markers of psychopathology (such as high anxiety scores) and 
that high self-concordance scores tend to be associated with markers of wellbeing 
(such as positive cognitions about the self), but cannot be taken to indicate any 
specific associations, particularly given their non-significance and the multiple 
exploratory correlations calculated. There were no indications of avoidance/approach 
motivations or self-concordance being associated with any other schematic belief 
subscales, or with worry scores. 
 
4.4 Feasibility and acceptability of the assessment 
procedure 
The feasibility and acceptability of the goal assessment process was of particular 
interest, because no previous reports are known in the literature of studies using this 
 Page 101 
protocol with a group of people with persecutory delusions. High completion rates 
and minimal missing data attest to the feasibility of the assessment procedure. Of the 
78 people whose names were put forward for the study, the researcher succeeded in 
contacting 47, and eight of these were excluded as not having current persecutory 
delusions. Therefore 39 suitable individuals were asked to take part in the study, and 
33 of these consented. This recruitment rate is in line with previous studies of this 
population (e.g. Green et al., 2008; Vorontsova et al., 2013), and with previous 
research regarding goals of people experiencing depression (Sherratt, 2011; Sherratt 
& MacLeod, 2013). None of those declining to take part cited characteristics of the 
study as a reason; rather, all said they were either too busy or too unwell to meet 
with the researcher. It is nevertheless relevant to consider that selection bias may 
have skewed the sample, for example towards those who were more keen to talk or 
less symptomatic at the time of being contacted. All participants who commenced the 
goal assessment process completed it. The three individuals who consented to take 
part in the project, but stopped before completing all the measures, did so during the 
first part of the procedure, which comprised clinical symptom assessments. All 
participants were able to identify multiple personal goals for the next year, and to 
select their top three goals without any evident difficulty. All participants identified 
additional goals when prompted using ten life domains, in addition to goals identified 
before prompting, and this is consistent with a suggestion that this type of prompting 
procedure is helpful for individuals to identify goals. All participants were furthermore 
able to report reasons for pursuing their chosen goals, and to rate goal self-
concordance. Complete data with no missing items in these domains supports the 
feasibility of the goal motivation assessment procedure. 
 
Examination of visual analogue scale ratings of mood at the start and end of the 
study procedure gave an indication of the acceptability of the assessment process. 
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Sadness ratings decreased significantly from the beginning to the end of the 
assessment procedure, and there was a nearly significant trend for increases in 
happiness ratings. No indications were found of any significant change in anxiety 
ratings. This pattern of findings does not suggest any adverse effects of the 
assessment procedure on participants' mood. The opposite, if anything, was 
indicated: that participants felt less sad, and marginally happier, on average, at the 
end of the assessments than when they began. It is possible that goal assessment 
itself may be therapeutic, and may induce positive changes in mood, although this 
cannot be concluded from the present correlational results alone. Caution is indicated 
in the interpretation of these findings. No a priori hypotheses were tested, and the 
pattern of findings may characterise the present participant group without applying on 
the whole to the population from which the group was drawn. No control group was 
examined for changes in mood over a similar period of time spent otherwise, and 
thus it cannot be determined that any changes in mood were associated with 
particular aspects of the assessment process. A number of confounding factors may 
have influenced participants' mood, including simply spending time in a quiet room 
and being listened to. Demand characteristics may have skewed participants' 
responses. All measures, including the mood ratings, were administered by the same 
researcher, and participants may have been reluctant to report feeling worse at the 
end of the procedure than at the start, in avoidance of causing concern for the 
examiner. Nevertheless, the positive pattern of mood rating changes is noteworthy 
and encouraging. The positive pattern in visual analogue scale mood rating changes 
was consistent with participants' qualitative feedback about participation in the study, 
which also indicated that the procedure was acceptable to those who took part. 
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4.5 Limitations 
The present study was the first known to have systematically examined the personal 
goals and motivations of a group of people with persecutory delusions. Caution is 
important in the interpretation of exploratory findings regarding goal content, as no a 
priori hypotheses were tested, and therefore the findings may not characterise the 
population beyond the present study sample. It is likely that the semi-structured 
format of the goal assessment procedure will have shaped the profile of goals 
generated by participants, due to the attentional effects of prompting and demand 
characteristics, even though it was made explicit that it was not necessary to 
generate a goal or goals for every category. The method used to assess goals and 
motivations was not absolutely the same as that used in any other study: goal 
content category prompting was used in combination with motivational and self-
concordance assessment of goals, in order that both a descriptive profile of goal 
content and a quantitative profile of goal motivations could be derived. The 
combination of these methods is not expected to have skewed the key findings in any 
systematic way, and robust effects should be detectable regardless of minor 
variations in measurement protocol. Caution is nevertheless indicated in comparing 
findings between studies with slightly different protocols.  
 
4.5.1 Sample 
The relatively small sample size used in this study indicates caution in the 
interpretation of findings, which may not necessarily generalise to the population 
beyond the present sample. The small sample size is particularly relevant to consider 
in relation to the negative finding regarding a correlation between depression scores 
and approach motivations for personal goals, discussed earlier in this chapter. The 
present study was powered only to detect relatively large effect sizes, and a larger 
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sample size may have allowed detection of statistically significant correlations with 
lower effect sizes. Nevertheless, the sample was of sufficient size to yield positive 
findings supporting two out of three quantitative hypotheses. Small, novel initial 
studies such as this one are necessary before larger, more resource-intensive 
studies are justified.  
 
The present study sample were all recruited from secondary care mental health 
services in one NHS Trust, situated in a relatively deprived area of North London, 
and aspects of their experiences may not generalise to the overall population of 
people with persecutory delusions. Recruitment rates for the study were in line with 
others recruiting from this population (e.g. Green et al., 2008; Vorontsova et al., 
2013), but selection bias may nevertheless have skewed the sample: for example, 
those more keen to talk and/or less symptomatic may have been overrepresented. 
All participants had schizophrenia-spectrum diagnoses, and it is possible that those 
with persecutory delusions in the context of other diagnoses, for example bipolar 
disorder, may have responded differently to the assessments, in the context of their 
different profiles of experience over time. Participants in this study were not screened 
for levels of other symptoms, such as hallucinations, as these were not relevant to 
the main study hypotheses, and it is possible that such unmeasured factors may 
have accounted for some of the variance in our variables of interest. 
 
The same experimenter made all SCAN ratings in the present study, and therefore 
no inter-rater reliability calculations were possible. The ratings were made to check 
agreement with diagnoses already made by participants' Consultant Psychiatrists, to 
ensure that participants met the study recruitment criteria. It is possible that the 
experimenter's ratings may have been skewed by knowing what the established 
diagnoses were, and that this may have inflated judgements of eligible diagnoses.  
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No comparison groups were included in the present study, which limits any 
inferences about features distinguishing people with persecutory delusions from 
other clinical groups. The present study did not aim to find aspects of goal motivation 
that would characterise groups with persecutory delusions specifically, as compared 
to others. Rather, the present study set out to extend the findings previously reported 
using groups without psychosis. The similar patterns of effects found in the results 
encourage analogous conceptualisations of underlying processes, as well as 
analogous approaches to therapeutic interventions.  
 
4.5.2 Design 
The cross-sectional design of the present study limits the interpretations that can be 
made regarding possible causal relationships between variables. Correlation is not 
sufficient to indicate causation, and evidence of causality can only be concluded 
when research using experimental designs has been carried out. A correlation 
between two variables at one point in time, such as those found in the present study, 
can indicate either one variable causing the other, or vice versa, or another 
unmeasured variable(s) affecting both those measured. Prospective longitudinal 
research would enable examination of the power of goal motivations to predict 
clinically relevant changes in symptom levels over time. Such findings would add 
further weight to the case for the involvement of personal goals and motivations in 
the maintenance of distressing persecutory beliefs, as well as of depression. 
Research using experimental designs will be needed before causality can be 
conclusively demonstrated.  
 
The present study did not compare a subgroup of individuals who met diagnostic 
criteria for a current major depressive episode to a subgroup who did not, because it 
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was not powered to detect the expected effects using such a comparison, and 
because the full spectrum of variability in depression scores was of interest, beyond 
a binary classification. Differences between subgroups of people with persecutory 
delusions with and without current clinical depression are of interest, however, 
including in situations where binary decisions may be made on the basis of 
diagnostic classification (e.g. to apply a depression-focused treatment, or not to?), 
and correspondingly comparisons between these subgroups have been made in 
previous research (e.g. Vorontsova et al., 2013). It would have been of interest to 
compare depressed and non-depressed subgroups in terms of motivations and self-
concordance of personal goals, if sufficient statistical power had been available to do 
so.  
 
4.5.3 Validity of measures 
The WTAR has been used in previous studies of people experiencing persecutory 
delusions, and the present study participants' average score of 88.13 is in line with 
those found by other studies of this population (e.g. Freeman et al., 2010; 
Vorontsova et al., 2013). The validity of the WTAR as a measure of pre-morbid IQ in 
this group is brought into question by the relatively low scores obtained overall, in the 
absence of any known learning disabilities or organic brain pathology, but in the 
context of five of the 30 participants lacking even secondary school education, and 
eight participants speaking English as a second language. Individuals with English as 
a second language and those lacking educational attainment were not excluded from 
the current study, and these groups evidently form a proportion of the population of 
people experiencing persecutory delusions. Poor performance on the WTAR may 
result from individuals never having been taught the pronunciation of the words 
included in the test, even though intellectually they may well have been capable of 
learning them. Caution is advisable in the interpretation of vocabulary-based tests 
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such as the WTAR as measures of IQ in groups with diverse educational and 
language backgrounds. It is also relevant to consider the validity of the other study 
measures, in light of eight participants speaking English as a second language. A 
lack of understanding or inability to express a response would pose a threat to the 
validity of interview and questionnaire measures. In each case, testing only went 
ahead if participants and their clinical teams agreed that they would not have any 
problems taking part in an interview or filling in questionnaires. The experimenter was 
always present to explain any written material, and to provide any relevant guidance 
on completing forms, and no problems arose with these for any of the participants, 
except for the one who was excluded from participation due to inability to concentrate 
on the materials. Psychological work in diverse communities necessitates continuous 
attention to the validity of measures, in the context of linguistic and educational 
differences. 
 
4.6 Clinical implications 
The present study findings carry a number of tentative clinical implications: some of 
these are rather general and may apply to many forms of talking therapy and other 
therapeutic interaction in mental health care, and others suggest some specific 
possible directions for therapeutic development. 
 
The indices of acceptability and feasibility of the goal assessment procedure used 
here give no suggestion of any adverse effects of goal assessment. The fact that all 
participants were able to identify extra goals when prompted using a set of ten life 
domains suggests that goal assessments in a clinical context may benefit from using 
a category set to support individuals in thinking about different areas of their lives in 
which goals may be held. No indications were evident of difficulty for this group in 
identifying goal motivations or rating self-concordance. The associations found here 
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and in the broader literature between motivations underlying goals (approach vs. 
avoidance) and goal self-concordance with depression and functional sequelae 
suggest that it might be appropriate to emphasise the assessment of goal 
motivations and self-concordance in clinical work, once goals themselves have been 
elicited. The reduction in self-rated low mood observed over the course of the 
assessment suggests that assessment of goals and motivations may in itself be a 
therapeutic process, although this remains inconclusive pending controlled studies. 
 
It could be particularly appropriate in the early stages of goal-focused psychological 
therapies, such as CBT, during the stage of goal selection and clarification, to 
explore the motivations behind individuals' goals. Sharing with individuals the 
message from research findings, that striving for goals motivated by avoidance may 
not bring about as good results as other goals, may help to support them in selecting 
goals to consciously strive for that are less likely to perpetuate depression and more 
likely to bring about positive gains in achievement over time. The addition of this 
motivational aspect to CBT has already been advocated for in the context of 
treatment for depression (e.g. Holtforth & Castonguay, 2005). The present study 
findings support a parallel role for the same processes in individuals experiencing 
persecutory delusions in the context of a psychotic disorder. It might be hoped that 
striving for goals motivated by approach rather than avoidance motivations can 
encourage a cognitive focus on possible positive consequences and deeply-held 
values, which might trigger associated positive affect and behavioural activation. In 
addition, the engagement with information in the environment that positive goal 
striving may facilitate could help individuals to attend to the balance of information 
(rather than focusing on possible threats) in a way that could help distressing beliefs 
to be re-evaluated over time. 
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Findings regarding an association between higher depression scores and more 
avoidance motivations for personal goals support a possible causal role for avoidant 
goal-directed thinking and behaviour in the maintenance of depression over time. 
This would need to be established more conclusively in future research, ideally with 
experimental/interventionist designs. There is also a suggestion in the present 
findings of a connection between avoidant goal motivations and the severity of 
paranoia. The paranoia link emerged from exploratory analyses, and is thus 
particularly tentative, but nevertheless interesting. With further evidence of the 
involvement of avoidant goal pursuit in the perpetuation of depression and/or 
distressing beliefs over time, it will be appropriate to trial interventions that may 
decrease individuals' avoidance in goal-striving and redirect them to other valued 
goals, those less motivated by avoidance and more by achievement. 
 
Findings regarding a negative association between goal self-concordance and 
depression invite the hypothesis that therapeutically increasing the self-concordance 
of individuals' goals, or intervening to increase pursuit of the more self-concordant 
goals among those that an individual holds, might have the power to increase their 
subsequent wellbeing and goal attainment. Sheldon and colleagues' self-
concordance intervention has so far only been trialled in a non-clinical setting, and 
only showed benefits for those already high in goal self-concordance (Sheldon et al., 
2002). If a clinical therapeutic application for such an intervention is to be considered, 
it will be important to assess its feasibility and acceptability in a clinical setting, as 
well as its possible effects.  
 
4.7 Indications for future research 
More research is warranted into the role that avoidant goal motivations and self-
concordance may play in the course of depression and delusional beliefs over time. 
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The present study made the first steps into systematically examining the personal 
goals and motivations of a group of people with persecutory delusions, and their 
associations with levels of depression. Given the encouraging results of the present 
investigation, further studies with increasingly robust designs and larger numbers of 
participants are warranted to replicate and extend the findings, as well as developing 
their clinical applications. Findings from multiple studies with greater numbers of 
participants would support the generalisability of findings to the population beyond 
the present study sample. 
 
4.7.1 Longitudinal research 
Accessibility of personally meaningful and motivating goals has been conceptualised 
here as a potential mediator or mechanism underlying the effect of depression on the 
persistence of persecutory delusions, but a formal mediational analysis was beyond 
the scope of the present study. A longitudinal observational study would be a logical 
next step. An investigation examining the variance in delusion persistence that might 
be accounted for by depression, and the extent to which this may in turn be 
accounted for by motivational characteristics of personal goals, would further 
illuminate the role that goal motivations and self-concordance might play. Any 
associations of avoidant motivations with safety behaviours would also be of interest, 
as it is theoretically plausible to suppose that avoidant motivations might contribute to 
delusion persistence via an increase in safety behaviours, which in turn prevent belief 
disconfirmation. It would further be of interest to examine individuals' goal 
motivations and self-concordance as predictors of any changes in depression 
occurring prospectively over time. Longitudinal findings regarding prospective 
predictive effects would lend support to hypotheses regarding the involvement of 
motivational characteristics of goals in symptom maintenance. It would also be of 
interest to examine any variation in goal achievement that might be predicted by 
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motivational factors, and whether this may mediate a predictive effect on functional 
outcomes. 
 
4.7.2 Multiple groups 
Further research into the goals and motivations of people with persecutory delusions 
could benefit from inclusion of comparison groups, for example of participants with 
non-psychotic depression and non-clinical controls, as have been included in other 
studies (e.g. Vorontsova, Garety and Freeman, 2013). Comparison of groups with 
persecutory delusions with and without co-occurring depression alongside groups 
with non-psychotic depression and non-clinical controls could reveal indications of 
features particularly associated with persecutory delusions and those particularly 
associated with depression. It will also be of interest to extend our understanding of 
the clinical significance of personal goals and motivations to other symptom domains, 
for example to examine any associations with hallucinations or with negative 
symptoms of psychosis. 
 
4.7.3 Experimental research 
With further support for a role of goal motivations and/or self-concordance in 
depression and/or delusion persistence over time, experimental interventionist 
research might then be warranted. It may be possible to experimentally manipulate 
individuals' goal motivation profiles by reinforcing approach motivations and 
reframing avoidance motivations over a period of time, as suggested by Holtforth and 
Castonguay for a therapeutic context (Holtforth & Castonguay, 2005). It would then 
be possible to evaluate any subsequent effects of the manipulation on individuals' 
symptoms, compared to a control group. Manipulations that are expected to have a 
positive effect (increasing approach and reducing avoidance motivation, increasing 
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self-concordance) would be primary candidates for lines of experimental research, 
which could have direct clinical application to therapeutic development.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
The present study has made the first steps towards developing an understanding of 
the personal goals and motivations of people with persecutory delusions, and how 
these might relate to symptoms. A descriptive profile of goals was presented, and 
quantitative analyses revealed associations of levels of depression with avoidant goal 
motivations and low self-concordance, as predicted. An exploratory link of avoidant 
motivation with paranoia was also found. The possibility that avoidant motivation in 
goal-directed thinking and behaviour might perpetuate the difficulties experienced by 
this group, as it is thought to do with depression, suggests avenues for therapeutic 
application. It is hoped that further research can continue to develop a motivational 
perspective on the experiences of those holding distressing persecutory beliefs, with 
the aim of improving psychological therapies for the future. 
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